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INTRODUCTION 
On June 4, 2013 the Utah Wildlife Board approved the Statewide Management Plan for 
Mountain Goat, a 5 year planning document governing mountain goat management activities by 
the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources (“DWR”).1 As part of the plan, the Wildlife Board 
approved the translocation2 of 20 mountain goats into the La Sal Mountains.3 The La Sals4 are 
                                                
1 UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., UTAH MOUNTAIN GOAT STATEWIDE MANAGEMENT PLAN, available at 
https://wildlife.utah.gov/hunting/biggame/pdf/mtn_goat_plan.pdf. 
2 “A translocation is the intentional release of animals to the wild in an attempt to establish, reestablish, or 
augment a population . . . .” Brad Griffith, J. Michael Scott, James W. Carpenter, & Christine Reed, SCI. Aug. 4, 
1989, at 477. 
3 Dylan Brown, in Utah land-use fight, 18 goats become unlikely stars, ENV. & ENERGY NEWS, Sept. 3, 
2014, available at http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060005159. 
4 The name “La Sal,” meaning “Salt” in Spanish, refers to the disbelief by Spanish missionaries who, when 
they first saw the mountain peaks blanketed with snow during late August, concluded that the white they saw on the 
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largely comprised of federal lands owned and managed by the United States Forest Service (“the 
Forest Service”) as the Manti-La Sal National Forrest.5 Shortly thereafter, the Forest Service 
received a request from a concerned citizen group requesting that the agency perform a National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) analysis on the introduction.6  
A second area of potential contention is the Deep Creek Mountains, a region on the 
western side of Utah.7 Much of this area is managed by the Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”) as the Deep Creek Wilderness Study Area, or WSA.8 Whereas the Forest Service’s 
polices are at least ambiguous, BLM policies explicitly prohibit the introduction of non-native 
species.9 
These two federal agencies may act to control wildlife on federal property to the extent 
that Congress has so authorized agency intervention.10 Therefore, the agencies may act to protect 
endangered species,11 control or prohibit the importation of certain species determined to be 
                                                                                                                                                       
peaks were “salt beds.” SILVESTRE VÉLEZ DE ESCALANTE, THE DOMÍNGUEZ-ESCALANTE JOURNAL: THEIR 
EXPEDITION THROUGH COLORADO, UTAH, ARIZONA, AND NEW MEXICO IN 1776 25-26 (Ted J. Warner ed., Fray 
Angelico Chavez transl., University of Utah Press ed. 1995) (1776). 
5 U.S. Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t Agric., Welcome to the Manti-La Sal National Forest (last visited Mar. 12, 
2014), http://www.fs.usda.gov/mantilasal. 
6 Letter from Mary H. O’Brien, Utah Forests Program Director, Grand Canyon Trust, to Nora Rasure, 
Regional Forester, Intermountain Regional Office, United States Forest Service, and Allen Rowley, Supervisor, 
Manti-La Sal National Forest 1 (Sept. 17, 2013) [hereinafter “Grand Canyon Trust letter”] (on file with Author). 
7 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Deep Creek Mountains WSA, BLM.gov (last visited Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://www.blm.gov/ut/st/en/fo/salt_lake/blm_special_areas/wilderness_study_areas/deep_creek_mountains.html. 
8 Id. (“The Deep Creek Mountains WSA consists of 68,910 acres in Tooele and Juab Counties and is 
managed by the Utah BLM West Desert District. Flanked on the east by the Great Salt Lake Desert and on the west 
by the Deep Creek Valley, this 32-mile long, 3 to 15 mile wide range is located in west central Utah, adjacent to the 
Utah-Nevada state line and approximately 55 miles south of Wendover, Utah.  The Deep Creek Mountains are the 
highest landmark in all of western Utah.”). 
9 See discussion infra Subsection III.B.iii. 
10 For example, both the Forest Service and BLM are authorized to manage the habitat, but not the wildlife 
itself. 36 C.F.R. § 293.10; 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(d). Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Interior are authorized to close 
certain areas to fishing and hunting “for reasons of public safety, administration, or compliance with provisions of 
applicable law.” Federal Land Policy and Management Act [hereinafter FLPMA], 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). However, 
even under these circumstances, “any regulations of the Secretary concerned relating to hunting and fishing pursuant 
to this section shall be put into effect only after consultation with the appropriate State fish and game department.” 
Id.  
11 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-205, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44. 
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invasive,12 and, in the case of the Forest Service, kill or otherwise remove wildlife that threaten 
the destruction of federal property.13 This last power, the power to protect managed land from 
destruction, is analogous to the private right of a landowner to destroy wildlife that threaten his 
or her private property.14 To the extent Congress has granted unto the executive agencies this 
power, the authorization is limited, like the private right mentioned,15 to the specific terms 
identified in the authorization—for example, wildlife that destroy or threaten to destroy federal 
property—and may not be expanded beyond the specific statutory authorization.16 As the 
Supreme Court concluded in 1976, although Congress may preempt State authority on federal 
land, the State exercises plenary authority over wildlife unless Congress has actually done so.17 
Through regulation and policy, however, the BLM and the Forest Service have created 
inroads on State authority in the context of wilderness areas, WSAs, and research natural areas 
                                                
12 See, e.g., Hawaii Tropical Forest Recovery Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4502a(a)(3)-(4) (2014) (authorizing the 
Forest Service to “protect indigenous plant and animal species and essential watersheds from non-native animals, 
plants, and pathogens [and] establish biological control agents for non-native species that threaten natural 
ecosystems.”); Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. § 42(a) (prohibiting a list of specific animal species and authorizing the 
Secretary of the Interior to enforce the Act). That the Lacey Act makes explicitly criminalizes the introduction of 
enumerated species further suggests the need for Congress to act  
13 Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1928). In this instance, the Department of Agriculture was 
acting pursuant to a Congressional mandate to “preserve the forest . . . from destruction.” (Act of Congress Feb. 1, 
1905).  
14 Compare Hunt, 278 U.S. at 100 (noting that the Secretary’s action was “necessary to protect the lands of 
the United States from serious injury”), with Annotation, Right to kill game in defense of property, 21 A.L.R. 199 
(1922). Although today this right is strictly limited in many States, see, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-16-2–4, the 
consensus in the early twentieth century favored the right of the landowner to protect his or her property, 
Annotation, Right to kill game in defense of property, 21 A.L.R. 199, 200 (1922) (“[A] statute forbidding, under 
penalty, the killing of elk [or other wildlife], does not apply to a killing which is reasonably necessary for the 
defense of persons or property.”). At the time, courts were inclined to find that preventing a property owner from 
protecting his or her property infringed the person’s property right. Id. at 100.  
Moreover, although the leading Supreme Court decision cast the State’s claim to title as “lean[ing] upon a 
slender reed,” Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920), the Supreme Court reaffirmed just four years after 
Holland and four years prior to Hunt that “[t]he wild animals within [a State’s] borders are, so far as capable of 
ownership, owned by the state in its sovereign capacity for the common benefit of all of its people,” Lacoste v, Dep’t 
of Conservation of State of La., 263 U.S. 545, 549 (1920). “Because of such ownership, . . . the state may regulate 
the taking . . . .” Id. 
15 Hunt, 278 U.S. at 100. 
16 United States v. Hunt, 19 F.2d 634, 640-41 (D. Ariz. 1927). 
17 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539.  See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Lacoste v. Dep’t of Conservation 
of State of La., 263 U.S. 545, 549 (1920). 
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(“RNAs”) beyond those authorized statutorily.18 The Organic Acts19 and other land management 
statutes20 of the various federal land management agencies also recognize and preserve State 
wildlife management authority—as that authority existed in 1976.21 Despite the federal 
encroachment, the translocation power remains an essential element of State authority.22 Because 
the Forest Service and BLM both lack Congressional authorization  to preempt State law23 as to 
the translocation of species on the public lands either agency manages,24 however, the State may 
exercise that authority to introduce any animal, native or non-native,25 on any BLM or Forest 
Service land where State has wildlife management authority.26 
At heart, the dispute centers less in the wildlife management conflict27 than the 
fundamental conflict between overlapping federal and State authority and the understanding of 
                                                
18 DOI regulations; 36 C.F.R. § 251.23 (authorizing “[t]he Chief of the Forest Service [to] . . . . establish a 
series of research natural areas.”). The BLM’s organic act permits the Secretary of the Interior to restrict of hunting 
and fishing “for reasons of public safety, administration, or compliance with provisions of applicable law.” 43 
U.S.C. § 1732(b).  Except to the extent that BLM’s non-native species policy must rely upon these limited 
restrictions in order to be valid, these exceptions are not relevant here. 
19 An “organic act” or “organic statute” is a law that establishes an administrative agency or local 
government.  Blacks Law Dictionary, 9th Ed.  In this context, it is an act of the United States Congress that creates 
an administrative agency to manage certain federal lands, or consolidates management authorities found in various 
statutory sections into a single act. For the relevant portion of the Organic Acts creating the Forest Service and 
BLM, see 16 U.S.C. § 528 (declaring that State Fish & Wildlife Agencies retain jurisdiction over wildlife in 
National Forests); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (same, regarding BLM-managed land).   
20 See, e.g, the Wilderness Act of 1964. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed 
as affecting the jurisdiction or responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish in the national 
forests.”).  
21 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 528 (“Nothing herein shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or 
responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish on the national forests.”); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) 
(“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as . . . enlarging or diminishing the responsibility and authority of the States 
for management of fish and resident wildlife.”). 
22 See infra Subsection III.A. 
23 See discussion infra Subsection III.B. 
24 See 16 U.S.C. § 528; § 1133(d)(7); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).  
25 This holds true unless that particular animal species is considered invasive and controlled under a 
legitimate Congressional grant of authority regulating invasive species. For a list of such federal laws and 
regulations in addition to a brief summary of the relevant powers Congress delegated pursuant to each, see Federal 
Laws and Regulations: Public Laws and Acts, National Invasive Species Information Center, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. 
(Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/laws/publiclaws.shtml. 
26 See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 545 (explaining that in the absence of contrary federal law regarding wildlife on 
federal land, “the States have broad trustee and police powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions.”). 
27 In other words, should the areas be managed in the “natural” state in which they are in, or should the 
State manage wildlife for the purpose of increasing human recreational opportunities? For a summary of this debate 
among wildlife management professionals, see Christian Gamborg, Clare Palmer, & Peter Sandoe, Ethics of Wildlife 
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that authority by the States and federal government.28 The resolution of this dispute is, therefore, 
much more important and fraught than a few goats in the mountains.29 Utah—like most of the 
Western States—is home to very large tracts of federal land which are home to a large portion of 
the wildlife managed by the State.30 To the extent that federal agencies like BLM and the Forest 
Service have the authority to unilaterally exclude mountain goats from the lands they manage, 
there is the justifiable concern that they might act to limit the State wildlife manager’s authority 
to carry out its other management activities, impacting outdoor recreational opportunities and 
revenues generated from the utilization of those opportunities.31 
Part I compares and contrasts the history of public land management in the United States 
and with the related history of the management of public wildlife resources. Part II outlines the 
current dispute between BLM, the Forest Service and Utah DWR over the introduction of 
mountain goats onto state-land near federally-managed RNAs. Part III discusses whether the 
BLM or the Forest Service have legal authority to preempt or subordinate state wildlife 
                                                                                                                                                       
Management and Conservation: What Should We Try to Protect?, 3 Nature Educ. Knowledge 8 (2012), available at 
http://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/ethics-of-wildlife-management-and-conservation-what-80060473 
(characterizing the debate as between two approaches to wildlife management: wise use of versus preservation of 
nature). 
28 See discussion infra Subsection III.A-B. 
29 Wood, supra note 3. 
30 This is no small issue: over 1 million acres of designated wilderness managed either by the BLM or the 
Forest Service is located in Utah alone. See Designated Wilderness, Forest Service, BLM, 
http://www.utah.com/playgrounds/designated_wilderness.htm. Further, the BLM currently manages 87 WSAs 
within the state. See Bureau of Land Management, WSA Maps (May 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.blm.gov/ut/st/en/prog/blm_special_areas/wilderness_study_areas/WSA_Maps.html. Additionally, the 
federal agencies manage numerous other types of special land designations managed by the federal government, 
including National Conservation Areas, National Monuments, and RNAs. Bureau of Land Management, Recreation: 
Places (May 19, 2014), http://www.blm.gov/ut/st/en/prog/recreation_home/places.html. All this land adds up: in 
Utah, the BLM manages approximately 22,854,937 acres while the Forest Service manages an additional 8,207,415 
acres. ROSS W. GORTE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND 
DATA, 12 (2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf. 
31 With such a large percentage of the state under federal land management authority, exercising 
management authority over habitat as a disguise for exercising management authority over wildlife would be a 
substantial infringement on state wildlife management authority and could substantially impair DWR’s ability to 
effectively manage wildlife populations and serve Utah’s citizens. WESTERN ASS’N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES, 
WHITE PAPER: WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT SUBSIDIARY 3-7 (June 2011), available at 
http://www.wafwa.org/documents/commissioners/CommitteeDocuments.pdf (describing how federal overreach 
complicates State management of wildlife). 
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management decisions on transplanting and releasing native or non-native wildlife on their 
respective lands, including Wilderness Areas, WSAs, and RNAs and considers more specifically 
whether the BLM or the Forest Service has authority to enjoin state translocation projects that 
release wildlife on federal lands or non-federal lands adjacent to federal lands. Part III 
additionally considers whether the existing permitting and regulatory regime established by 
BLM and the Forest Service applies to the several States in the same fashion as it applies to 
private individuals. 
Part IV evaluates the claim that NEPA is violated where the relevant federal land 
management agency fails to prevent a State-authorized wildlife translocation and subsequently 
fails to remove the species from federal lands. Part V briefly evaluates the limitations, or lack 
thereof, on the tools available to the States in undertaking wildlife management projects without 
obtaining prior federal approval. Part VI concludes by reaffirming State authority to manage 
wildlife in the absence of Congressional abrogation of that authority. Also, Part VI notes that 
apparently contrary Forest Service and BLM regulations either do not apply to the States, are 
contrary to governing statutes as applied to the States, or exceed statutory and regulatory 
authority as applied and concludes, therefore, that the federal government may not interfere with 
the State of Utah’s mountain goat translocation plan. 
I. BACKGROUND 
By a quirk of history, the management of federal land itself is governed differently than 
the wildlife residing thereon.32 Federal agencies, like the Forest Service and BLM, but also the 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and Department of Defense, manage the 
                                                
32 See discussion infra Subsections I.A. and I.B. 
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land or the habitat of wildlife.33 The federal government adopted this land management policy 
after nearly a century of relative disinterest by the States and private parties in the remaining 
federal lands.34 Even as this shift occurred, Congress was careful to preserve the status quo of 
state management with regards to wildlife management authority.35 The management of wildlife 
remains, therefore, as it traditionally has: reserved to the States, even on federal lands.36 
Congress may exercise its plenary power over federal property to preempt State management.37 
Where Congress has not explicitly done so or has acted instead to reserve this power to the 
States,38 State management authority of wildlife is limited only to the extent that the exercise of 
that authority conflicts with the lawfully established authority of the respective federal agency 
established by Congress and charged with managing that particular segment of federal land or 
that particular activity.39 Finally, the State is charged with managing wildlife as a public trust for 
all of its citizens.40 
A. Land Management 
                                                
33 “While the several States therefore possess primary authority and responsibility for management of fish 
and resident wildlife . . . .  [m]anagement of the habitat is a responsibility of the Federal Government.” 43 C.F.R. § 
24.4(d). See also 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(c) (recognizing that although BLM is charged with the management of lands for 
fish and wildlife conservation, State fish and wildlife agencies exercise “the primary authority and responsibility . . . 
for management of fish and resident wildlife on such lands”); 36 C.F.R. § 293.10 (accord with the Forest Service). 
34 See, e.g., COMM’R OF THE GEN. LAND OFFICE, DEP’T OF INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE 7 (1875) (describing disinterest by settlers in desert lands as having 
stymied the effectiveness of the available land grants in the then-existing States and Territories of the United States). 
Given the prevailing assumption of State management of wildlife, the report makes no mention of wildlife 
management. Id.  
35 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006) (“[N]othing in this Act shall be construed as . . . . enlarging or diminishing 
the responsibility and authority of the States for management of fish and resident wildlife.”). 
36 Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2002). 
37 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540-41 (1976) (“Although the Property Clause does not authorize 
an exercise of a general control over public policy in a State, it does permit an exercise of the complete power which 
Congress has over particular public property entrusted to it. In our view, the ‘complete power’ that Congress has 
over public lands necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect the wildlife living there.”). 
38 Congress has done so on numerous occasions. Most relevantly here, see 16 U.S.C. § 528; § 1133(d)(7); 
and 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
39 See, e.g., Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 99 (1928); Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-3. 
40 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1896). 
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The contrasting approaches between wildlife and habitat (i.e. land) management are a 
product of history, tradition, and the underlying statutory schema superimposed upon the federal 
land management agencies by Congress.41 The American schema of land management began as 
little more than a blanket policy of disposal.42 In the American West, however, federal settlement 
programs never really “took off,”43 allowing for a gradual federal policy shift towards retention 
and protection of existing federal property.44  
                                                
41 “While the several States therefore possess primary authority and responsibility for management of fish 
and resident wildlife . . . .  [m]anagement of the habitat is a responsibility of the Federal Government.” 43 C.F.R. § 
24.4(d). For a summary of the history and tradition behind State approaches to wildlife management, see discussion 
infra Subsection I.B. 
42 In fact, some of the earliest federal programs were directed at land disposal. For example, even prior to 
the creation of the federal Constitution, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 established a procedure for what were then 
the “Western lands” held by the federal government. Robert Barrett, History on an Equal Footing: Ownership of the 
Western Lands, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 761, 766 (1997); see also An Act to Provide for the Government of the 
Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, Art. V (1789), reprinted in 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 659, 663 
(2004). 
Even so, these programs were always controversial. For example, in 1828, Governor Ninian Edwards of 
Illinois “maintained that the Constitution gave the federal government no power to exercise control over the public 
lands in a state after its admission to the Union.” PAUL WALLACE GATES & ROBERT W. SWENSON, PUBLIC LAND 
LAW REVIEW COMM’N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 9 (1968). Within thirty years, after various 
land grants and years of land sales, “virtually all the public lands were gone” in Illinois. Id. at 18. 
43 Some thirteen years after the passage of the Homestead Act of 1862, which was intended to facilitate the 
settlement of the West, the Commissioner of the General Land Office wrote that, “it may be safely affirmed that, 
except in the immediate valleys of the mountain streams, where by dint of individual effort water may be diverted 
for irrigating purposes, title to the public lands cannot be honestly acquired under the homestead laws.” COMM’R OF 
THE GEN. LAND OFFICE, DEP’T OF INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND 
OFFICE 7 (1875). Whereas much of the land East of the Mississippi was suitable for farming or agricultural 
production, the arid, mountainous regions of the West proved much less attractive, leading the Secretary of the 
Interior to describe this land in 1946 as “the land which nobody wanted very much, the land without people.” U.S. 
DEP’T OF INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 29 (1946). See also E. LOUISE PEFFER, 
THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: DISPOSAL AND RESERVATION POLICIES, 1900-1950, at 3 (1951). This land 
was of such a quality that “[w]ithout water, most of what remained could never be expected to furnish arable farms.” 
Id. 
44 In 1897, during debate on what became the Forest Service Organic Act, Representative McRae (D-Ark.) 
presciently declared: 
The purpose of [this Act] is the protection of our forests; and let me tell you that in less than fifty 
years from today, unless a change is made, you will find that the condition of the country which is 
today being denuded of its forests . . . will present a condition of affairs which will come home to 
many of you with force and power. 
We want to protect our forests. . . . If the land is not fit for homesteads—and I assume 
that much of it is not, or it would have been taken up years ago; indeed it is admitted that it is 
not—what better use can we put it than to place it in a timber reservation? 
30 Cong. Rec. 969 (1897) (statement of Rep. Thomas McRae). Arguably, this shift began, however, during 
the early 1870s with the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872. Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA) of 1976: How the Stage Was Set for BLM’s “Organic Act, U.S. BUREAU LAND MGMT., 
http://www.blm.gov/flpma/organic.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). However, it was not until the passage of 
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The ultimate product of this effort, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 
(“FLPMA”) embodied this shift.45 Thus, since 1976 land policy sharply shifted toward retention 
of public lands and management for multiple uses, including recreation.46 The Supreme Court, 
reviewing these changes in management policy and structure under the property clause of the 
United States Constitution47 determined that Congress has sweeping authority to regulate the 
federal lands as it sees fit.48 Congress has chosen to do so, however, by limiting agency authority 
to prevent public access to public lands to a small subset of particular reasons.49 
B. Wildlife Management 
In deference to longstanding state authority on the subject,50 and perhaps due in part to 
the federal government’s perceived inadequacy in managing the situation on the ground 
throughout its extensive land holdings,51 the shift in land management policy did not entail a 
                                                                                                                                                       
FLPMA in 1976 that “Congress expressly declared as policy that the remaining public domain lands would be 
retained in federal ownership unless disposal of a particular parcel served the national interest.” Id. 
45 See 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006) (“Congressional Declaration of Policy”). Among other things, this Act 
created the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and assigned to it the duty to manage most federal land. § 1731(a)-
(b) (creating Bureau of Land Management and assigning it the duty to administer FLPMA). 
46 Arguably, this shift began as early as the early 1870s with the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 
1872. Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976: How the Stage Was Set for BLM’s “Organic 
Act, U.S. BUREAU LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/flpma/organic.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). However, it 
was not until the passage of FLPMA in 1976 that “Congress expressly declared as policy that the remaining public 
domain lands would be retained in federal ownership unless disposal of a particular parcel served the national 
interest.” Id.  
47 U.S. CONST. art. IV § 3, cl. 2. 
48 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976). 
49 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2012). 
50 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 545. 122 Cong. Rec. 34,373 (1976) (“Traditionally, the States have regulated fishing 
and hunting of resident species of wildlife. The BLM and the Forest Service . . . have focused on management of 
their habitat. This bill does nothing to change that.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, the legislative history suggests that 
Congress was concerned not with the translocation or introduction of species, but rather with unregulated hunting of 
species whose numbers were much reduced. Id.; see also infra Subsection I.B.ii. 
51 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, 4 (1970). During the first one hundred 
years of the Nation’s existence, the federal government practiced what was, in effect, a “no-management policy” 
that “naturally led to multiple use of the federal lands as grazing, timber, and mineral interests each attempted to 
maximize their harvest of targeted resources.” Scott W. Hardt, Federal Land Management in the Twenty-First 
Century: From Wise Use to Wise Stewardship, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 352 (1994). This allowed “ individual 
and corporate trespassers [to] effectively exploit[] th[e]se lands” with impunity; even as the General Land Office 
recognized the threatened destruction of public lands, it remained powerless to stop them because it had such few 
resources available. Id. at 352 n.36. 
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commensurate shift in wildlife management authority.52 Because the American legal doctrines 
upon which wildlife management are based are derived from Roman and English Law, a brief 
review of each follows.53 
i. History: Law of Capture, Early English and Roman Law 
Both Roman and English Law recognized ultimate state ownership and control of 
wildlife.54 In ancient Rome, wildlife was considered res nullius or a “thing owned by no one.”55 
Once captured, however, the person capturing became owner of the wild animal, even if it was 
taken on the land of another.56 Even so, wild animals “belonged ‘in common to all citizens of the 
State,’”57 meaning that the State had the authority to regulate taking.58 
In England, wildlife similarly belonged to the sovereign—first the king, and later 
parliament exercised exclusive authority to regulate hunting.59 In this environment, regulations 
were based on a “post-wilderness” conception of society and hunting privileges were disbursed 
for the purpose of maintaining feudal hierarchy.60 Historically, European aristocracy held a 
monopoly on hunting.61  For example, both the king and parliament allowed wealthy nobles to 
hunt, but excluded the common people.62 
                                                
52 This is most apparent within FLPMA itself. 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (“[N]othing in this Act shall be construed 
as . . . enlarging or diminishing the responsibility and authority of the States for management of fish and 
resident wildlife [on federal land].”).  
53 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-28 (1896). 
54 Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American Rule of 
Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 677-84 (2005). 
55 Id. at 678. 
56 Id. 
57 Deborah G. Musiker, Tom France, Lisa A. Hallenbeck, The Public Trust and Parens Patriae Doctrines: 
Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 Pub. Land L. Rev. 87, 92 (1995).  
58 Although the Roman State possessed this power, evidence suggests that it was rarely utilized. Blumm & 
Ritchie, supra note 54, at 678. 
59 In principle, the king and parliament managed wildlife for the common interest, Musiker, France, & 
Hallenbeck, supra note 57, at 92, but in practice, the allotment of hunting privileges heavily favored elites, Blumm 
& Ritchie, supra note 54, at 683-84. 
60 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 54, at 686. 
61  English law “assign[ed] ownership of common property to the king . . . . result[ing] in the 
dispersion of privileges taken or allowed by royalty.” Id. at 11. In Europe generally, “kings and aristocrats . . . 
restrict[ed] hunting to a very narrow social stratum . . . . [as a result] [m]ost of the social history of hunting revolves 
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ii. American Experience from the Founding to the Early Modern Era 
Early American decisions reaffirmed the English and Roman law of capture,63 but 
gradually expanded the right of the common people to hunt. When Europeans immigrated to 
North America, they found a seemingly inexhaustible supply of wildlife in the public commons 
available for taking, and they also were no longer legally barred from hunting.64 States inherited 
the king’s authority after the Revolution,65 but were charged by the United States Supreme Court 
to manage wildlife in trust for the people.66  
One of the greatest contrasts between the English and American systems of wildlife 
management is that the American system relies upon local governing units—the States—to 
allocate wildlife resources, rather than a centralized management policy at the national level 
which favors elites.67 Initially, this difference led to the explosion of both opportunity and 
exploitation in America68 and caused overharvesting of species: many to scarcity, and some even 
                                                                                                                                                       
around the justifications for and enforcement of [this] noble monopoly.” JOHN THEIBAULT, “HUNTING,” EUROPE, 
1450 TO 1789: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EARLY MODERN WORLD (2004), available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/hunting.aspx.  
62 Id. at 684. 
63 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (“[M]ere pursuit gave Post no legal right to the fox, 
but that he became the property of Pierson, who intercepted and killed him.”). 
64  Carlos A. Peres, Overexploitation, in CONSERVATION BIOLOGY FOR ALL (2010) (Navjot S. Sodhi 
& Paul R. Ehrlich eds.). 
65 Musiker, France, & Hallenbeck, supra note 57, at 93. See also Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 
410-11 (1846). 
66 Martin, 41 U.S. at 432-433 (requiring State to hold public lands in trust for the people such that there was 
a “common right of fishery” in the trust waters). 
67 Note that the aristocratic system in England necessarily kept the eligible pool of hunters very small. With 
few members of society eligible, or indeed able, to hunt, the available wildlife resource was maintained for 
centuries. ANDERS HALVERSON, AN ENTIRELY SYNTHETIC FISH: HOW RAINBOW TROUT BEGUILED AMERICA AND 
OVERRAN THE WORLD 74-75 (2010). Given the very different constraints in the United States, American Fish & 
Wildlife agencies engage in very proactive management to maximize the available resource. This duty is carried out 
in trust for the people of the State. 
68 Between 1800 and 1890 the population of: 
- Buffalo dropped from 40 million to several thousand, or less; 
- White-Tailed Deer dropped from 24 million to 500,000; and 
- Wild Turkey dropped from 15 million to 30,000.  
DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE CRUSADE FOR 
AMERICA 205 (2009). The population of other key species—such as Pronghorn Antelope and Elk—were down 
about 98 percent from their levels at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Id. at 206. 
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to extinction.69 Public recognition of this dramatic decline in wildlife populations sparked the 
conservation movement.70  Figures such as President Theodore Roosevelt and conservationist 
Aldo Leopold “envisioned a nation where all citizens had an opportunity to engage in 
conservation and hunting.”71   
President Roosevelt,72  having grown concerned after witnessing firsthand the dramatic 
decline in North American “big game” species, founded the Boone and Crockett Club in January 
1888.73 The Club’s first efforts were to promote the idea of a “fair chase” doctrine in hunting and 
the creation of wilderness preserves to protect “buffalo, antelope, mountain goats, elk, and 
deer.”74 To this end, the Club pursued federal legislation protecting wildlife in the National Park 
System—which explains to a large degree the greater control the National Park Service exercises 
in wildlife management and control as compared to other federal land management agencies.75 
                                                
69 Take, for example, the rapid extinguishment of the passenger pigeon between 1871 and 1914. During this 
period, the pigeon population plummeted from an estimated “hundreds of millions (or even billions)” to one, and 
then none. Barry Yeoman, Why the Passenger Pigeon Went Extinct, AUDUBON MAGAZINE (May-June 2014), 
available at http://www.audubonmagazine.org/articles/birds/why-passenger-pigeon-went-extinct.  
70 Id. (noting that the modern conservation movement began in partial response to the extinction of the 
passenger pigeon). 
71 John Organ, et al., The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation, THE WILDLIFE SOCIETY AND 
THE BOONE AND CROCKETT CLUB Technical Review 12-04 (Dec. 2012) at 23 [hereinafter Technical Review]. 
72 Interestingly enough, President Roosevelt’s uncle Robert was a prominent member of the American 
Acclimatization Society—a group devoted to the translocation of “exotic species”—who advocated on behalf of the 
introduction of Rainbow Trout into the waters of New York State. American Acclimatization Society, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 15, 1877. This doubly interesting because Robert Roosevelt is credited as a key inspiration for young 
Theodore’s interest in nature and conservation. BRINKLEY, supra note 68, at 80 (“[Robert Roosevelt], more than any 
other direct influence, turned Theodore Roosevelt into a conservationist as a teenager.”). 
73  BRINKLEY, supra note 68, at 201-07. 
74  Id. at 201. “[A] man who wastefully destroys big game, whether for the market, or only for the 
heads, has nothing of the true sportsman about him.” Id. at 207. 
75  Id. at 201, 205-06 (noting that the Club became “the most important lobbying group to promote all 
national parks”). Note, however, that these enhanced restrictions apply almost exclusively in the national parks 
rather than other lands, such as national monuments, also administered by the National Park Service. See, e.g., 
National Park Service, Sleeping Bear Dunes: Hunting, available at 
http://www.nps.gov/slbe/planyourvisit/hunting.htm (last visited May 6, 2015); National Park Service, Glen Canyon: 
Orange Cliffs, available at http://www.nps.gov/glca/planyourvisit/orange-cliffs.htm (last visited May 6, 2015) 
(“Hunting is permitted in Glen Canyon, during hunting season, with proper license only.”). 
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The Club, which remains active today, pioneered the framework that has developed into 
the current wildlife management scheme in the United States.76  This framework is known as the 
North American Model of Wildlife Conservation (“the Model”).77 The Model groups and 
restates several wildlife conservation principles that U.S. jurisdictions have applied over the past 
century to develop successful programs for wildlife management.78 Seven “pillars,” compose the 
Model.79  These seven pillars are used as a “means to understand, evaluate, and celebrate how 
conservation has been achieved in the U.S. and Canada, and to assess whether we are prepared to 
address challenges that lay ahead.”80 Three of these pillars are implicated in the mountain goat 
debate: Wildlife as a Public Trust Resource, Scientific Management,81 and the Democracy of 
Hunting.82  
1. States manage wildlife as a public trust resource according to  
wildlife policy based on science, not supposition or emotion 
At the most basic level, State authority to manage wildlife rests on this principle: wildlife 
cannot be privately owned.83 Therefore, States manage wildlife on behalf of their citizens.84 
                                                
76  For example, “[o]n a hunt . . . members were absolute equals.” Id. at 204. This echoes the 
democratic principles enshrined by the North American Model of Wildlife Conservation. See infra Subsection 
I.B.ii.2. 
77  Valerius Geist, John Organ & Shane Mahoney, Born in the Hands of Hunters: the North American 
Model of Wildlife Conservation, THE WILDLIFE PROFESSIONAL 22, 25-27 (2010), available at 
http://www.odwc.state.ok.us/aboutodwc/Born%20in%20the%20Hands%20of%20Hunters[6].pdf. But see Michael 
P. Nelson, John A. Vucetich, Paul C. Paquet, & Joseph K. Bump, An Inadequate Construct? North American 
Model:What’s Flawed, What’s Missing, What’s Needed, THE WILDLIFE PROFESSIONAL, Summer 2013, at 58, 
available at http://www.isleroyalewolf.org/sites/default/files/Nelson%20et%20al%202011-
An%20Inadequate%20Construct.pdf (questioning the ethic and history behind the North American Model). 
78  These pillars are (1) wildlife as a public trust resource, (2) the elimination of markets for game, (3) 
allocation of wildlife by law, (4) kill only for legitimate purpose, (5) wildlife as an international resource, (6) 
science-based wildlife policy, and (7) democracy of hunting. Geist, Organ, & Mahoney, supra note 77, at 27. 
79  Id. 
80  Technical Review, supra note 71, at viii. 
81  This includes insuring that any decisions are made based on actual science, rather than baseless 
supposition. UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., supra note 1, at 5. 
82  Geist, supra note 77, at 27. 
83  Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 414 (1846) (finding that the State of New Jersey could 
not assign the rights to collect shellfish in a particular area to a single individual because the people exercised the 
“public and common right of fishery in navigable waters”). 
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Although the United States Congress may have determined that certain wildlife management 
practices—such as the preservation of endangered species—is to be better managed at the federal 
level,85 State policymakers are better able to devote the resources necessary to manage 
recreational hunting and fishing within their own territories.86 Such an approach requires 
management policy based on scientific data, rather than aesthetic or emotive judgments.87 This 
means that “[s]cience [is the] basis for informed decision-making in wildlife management.”88 
Through science, good management principles have been discovered that allow for the 
“management of diverse species . . . under highly complex circumstances.”89 Science, guides the 
                                                                                                                                                       
84  WESTERN ASS’N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES, supra note 84, at 2-4; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 
U.S. 519, 529-30 (1896). 
85  16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (preempting State laws or regulations in conflict with Endangered Species 
Act). Even in the endangered species context, however, State expertise is crucial to facilitate the management goals 
of federal agencies. See, e.g., Interagency Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in ESA Activities, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 34,275, 34275 (July 1, 1994) (“[I]n the exercise of their general governmental powers, States possess broad 
trustee and police powers over fish, wildlife and plants and their habitats within their borders. Unless preempted by 
Federal authority, States possess primary authority and responsibility for protection and management of fish, 
wildlife and plants and their habitats. 
“State agencies often possess scientific data and valuable expertise on the status and distribution of 
endangered, threatened and candidate species of wildlife and plants. State agencies, because of their authorities and 
their close working relationships with local governments and landowners, are in a unique position to assist the 
Services in implementing all aspects of the [Endangered Species] Act.”). 
86  Geist, Organ, & Mahoney, supra note 77, at 26.  
87  Past experience has demonstrated that where this is not the case, the unintended consequences can 
be devastating. For example, Gray Wolves were extirpated throughout the contiguous United States largely based on 
prejudice. See, e.g., MICHELLE LUTE, HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF WOLF MANAGEMENT IN MICHIGAN 2 (2013), 
available at https://www.msu.edu/~lutemich/site/publications_files/hdwm_lute_litreview.pdf (explaining in part that 
“Wolves were . . . removed from human-dominated landscapes out of fear, [and] considered ‘evil’ and 
‘gluttonous’”). Like many other wildlife management decisions taken with inadequate consideration, the results 
were both negative and unexpected. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 138-40 (1989) (“In those days we 
had never heard of passing up a chance to kill a wolf. . . . I was young then, and full of trigger-itch; I thought that 
because fewer wolves meant more deer, that no wolves would mean hunters' paradise. But after seeing the green fire 
die, I sensed that neither the wolf nor the mountain agreed with such a view. 
“Since then I have lived to see state after state extirpate its wolves. I have watched the face of many a 
newly wolfless mountain, and seen the south-facing slopes wrinkle with a maze of new deer trails. I have seen every 
edible bush and seedling browsed, first to anaemic desuetude, and then to death. I have seen every edible tree 
defoliated to the height of a saddlehorn. Such a mountain looks as if someone had given God a new pruning shears, 
and forbidden Him all other exercise. In the end the starved bones of the hoped-for deer herd, dead of its own too-
much, bleach with the bones of the dead sage, or molder under the high-lined junipers.”). Ironically, this very 
practice—the elimination of wolves—precipitated the Hunt decision which is now at the center of the State-federal 
management debate. United States v. Hunt, 19 F.2d 634, 640 (D. Ariz. 1927). 
88  Geist, Organ, & Mahoney, supra note 77, at 27. 
89  Id. 
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range of management options that wildlife managers should choose from.90 In modern days, it is 
typical for a policy making board, such as Utah’s Wildlife Board, to then choose which of those 
options they believe is in the best interest of the State, based on a range of concerns, such as 
economic impacts, social issues, and concerns for private property rights.91 These decisions are 
made after holding numerous public meetings and considering public input.92   
2. A democratic approach to the management of wildlife 
resources through hunting 
In many ways, this final principle is the most important because the very idea of the 
public trust presupposes public access to trust resources.93 The basic premise of this final pillar is 
that every citizen is entitled to the freedom to hunt and fish.94 As the Wildlife Society puts it, 
“[t]he opportunity for citizens in good standing to hunt in Canada and the U.S. is a hallmark of 
our democracy.”95   
Today, drawing on that legacy, the United States takes an internationally-uncommon, 
democratic approach to hunting.96  Its approach, based on the Model, recognizes the historical 
universal right of access to wildlife, which is considered a right of citizenship in our democratic 
                                                
90  However, “a trend towards greater influence in conservation decision making by political 
appointees versus career managers profoundly threatens the goal of science-based management.” Id. 
Like how the Forest Service reversed itself on the goat issue after facing pressure from the Grand Canyon 
Trust. Letter from Angelita S. Bulletts, Supervisor, Dixie National Forest on behalf of Dixie, Fishlake and Manti-La 
Sal National Forests, to Kevin Bunnell, Regional Supervisor, Utah Division of Wildlife Res. (May 3, 2013) (“[W]e 
support the Mountain Goat Statewide Plan and look forward to continuing to work with you.”) (on file with Author). 
Letter from Nora Rasure, Regional Forester, Intermountain Region, U.S. Forest Service, to Gregory Sheehan, 
Executive Secretary, Utah Board of Wildlife (Aug. 21, 2013) (“The Forest Service does not support the proposal at 
this time . . . .”). One has to wonder what in the science changed between May and August 2013. 
91 See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-14-2, -3.   
92 See Utah Code Ann. § 23-14-2.6; § Title 52 Chapter 4 Utah Code (“Open and Public Meetings Act”). 
93  Id. Some believe that “the greatest historical meaning of the public trust is that certain interests . . . 
are so intrinsically important that their free availability marks a society as one of citizens rather than serfs.” Id. 
94  The North American Model of Wildlife Conservation, Sportsmen, and the Boone and Crockett 
Club, The Boone and Crockett Club (March 2013), www.boone-
crockett.org/conservation/conservation_NAM.asp?area=conservation. 
95  The Public Trust Doctrine: Implications for Wildlife Management and Conservation in the United 
States and Canada, THE WILDLIFE SOCIETY (Sept. 2010), Technical Review 10-01 at 23, available at 
http://www.fw.msu.edu/documents/ptd_10-1.pdf. 
96  THE WILDLIFE SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 23. 
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society according to the Boone and Crocket Club.97  Additionally, this approach recognizes the 
need to have democratic input into wildlife management decisions, as well as the states’ duty to 
conserve wildlife so that citizens will have continuing access to it.98  Such access “fosters 
individual stewardship and provides the funding necessary to properly manage wildlife resources 
in a sustainable manner.”99 
iii. What is Wildlife Management and just how broad is it?: the industry 
understanding and traditional management authority 
In no case challenging the limits of State and federal authority over wildlife management 
has either party challenged whether the activity in question constituted “wildlife management”—
or not.100 Instead, the dispute is the extent of State or federal authority vis-à-vis the other.101 This 
does not mean that the meaning of wildlife management is unimportant: for example, because 
FLPMA preserves “the responsibility and authority of the States for management of fish and 
resident wildlife,”102 BLM may not intrude upon State activities that fall within the rubric of 
“wildlife management.”103 Under any reasonable definition of the phrase, wildlife translocation 
is “wildlife management.”104 
                                                
97  Boone and Crockett, supra note 7. 
98  Id. 
99  Id. 
100 See, e.g., Mich. Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 206-08 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding that because 
National Park Service may prohibit any wildlife management activity by the States that is not specifically authorized 
by the organic act of a particular park unit, the National Park Service could prohibit “trapping” within Pictured 
Rocks and Sleeping Bear National Lakeshores although “hunting” was authorized); Wyoming v. United States. 279 
F.3d 1214, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that language of the Act allowed the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to 
prohibit Wyoming officials from vaccinating elk on the National Elk Refuge, but not that the vaccination of elk was 
not “wildlife management”). 
101 Again, the dispute of the above cases was over the boundary between State and federal management 
authority; no parties disputed that the activities in which the States were engaged constituted “wildlife 
management.” Wyoming, 279 F.3d at 1231-32. 
102 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2014). 
103 “[T]here common ideas are present in every definition of wildlife management, including: 1) efforts 
directed toward wild animal populations, 2) relationship of habitat to those wild animal populations, and 3) 
manipulations of habitats or populations that are done to meet some specified human goal.” GREG YARROW, FACT 
SHEET 36, WILDLIFE & WILDLIFE MGMT. 2 (May 2009), available at 
https://www.clemson.edu/extension/natural_resources/wildlife/publications/pdfs/fs36_wildlife_and_wildlife_manag
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As a traditional power exerted by the States in exercising the authority to manage wildlife 
on federal lands, the States impliedly hold the translocation power to the extent Congress has 
neither implicitly nor explicitly restricted that authority. This is because the translocation power 
is as fundamental and ancient105 a power as any and is central to wildlife management 
authority.106  As such, Congress must act explicitly to remove this authority from the States in 
order to restrict State management authority.107   
 Rather than demonstrating the intent to restrict State authority to manage wildlife on 
federal land, Congress since Missouri v. Holland has repeatedly reaffirmed the principal role of 
State Fish and Wildlife agencies in the matter.108  For example, during the debate leading to the 
                                                                                                                                                       
ement.pdf (emphasis added). The Journal of Wildlife Management, for example, made the following statement 
about what constitutes “wildlife management” in its inaugural issue in 1937: 
Management along sound biological lines means management according to the needs and 
capacities of the animals concerned, as related to the environmental complex in which they are 
managed. It does not include the sacrifice of any species for the benefit of others, though it may 
entail the reduction of competing forms where research shows this is necessary. It consists largely 
of enrichment of environment so that there shall be maximum production of the entire wildlife 
complex adapted to the managed areas. Wildlife management is not restricted to game 
management, though game management is recognized as an important branch of wildlife 
management. It embraces the practical ecology of all vertebrates and their plant and animal 
associates. While emphasis may often be placed on species of special economic importance, 
wildlife management along sound biological lines is also part of the greater movement for 
conservation of our entire native fauna and flora. 
Statement of Policy, 1 J. OF WILDLIFE MGMT. 1, 1-2 (1937). 
104 To translocate a species from one location to another cannot reasonably be defined as anything other 
than the “manipulation[] of habitats or populations . . . done to meet some specified human goal.” YARROW, supra 
note 103, at 2. Such introductions and translocations fit within the “wise use” approach to “wildlife management.” 
Gamborg, Palmer, & Sandoe, supra note 27, at 8 (“The wise use approach aims to accommodate humanity's 
continuous use of wild nature as a resource for food, timber, and other raw materials, as well as for recreation. The 
idea of wise use appeals to our own best interests, or to the interests of humans over time, including future people 
(this approach is often called ‘sustainable use’). The goal of management is to enhance and maintain nature's yield 
as a valuable resource for human beings.”). 
105  See, e.g. Ether 2:2-3, Book of Mormon (“And they did also lay snares and catch fowls of the air; 
and they did also prepare a vessel, in which they did carry with them the fish of waters. And they did also carry with 
them . . . . swarms of bees, and all manner of that which was upon the face of the land, seeds of every kind.”); 1 
Nephi 16:11, Book of Mormon (“[W]e did take seed of every kind that we might carry into the wilderness.”); 1 
Nephi 18:24, Book of Mormon (“And it came to pass that we did begin to till the earth, and we began to plant seeds; 
yea, we did put all our seeds into the earth, which we had brought from the land of Jerusalem. And it came to pass 
that they did grow exceedingly; wherefore, we were blessed in abundance.”). 
106  See infra Subsection III.A. 
107  Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2002). 
108 Same as FN 83 
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enactment of the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960,109 the Act was amended to include 
language making explicit that the Act did not affect the jurisdiction of the States.110 The 
legislative history of the bill makes clear that the Senate agreed to an amendment introducing 
this language at the behest of the House even though “[it] felt that there was no need for this 
provision” because the Act was never intended to affect or alter State authority with respect to 
wildlife.111 Senator Humphrey read into the record a letter urging the Senate to adopt the 
amendment “as merely stating what has been everyone’s intent.”112 
C. Relevant Statutory Authority 
 Congress has spoken directly to the issue of State management of wildlife on a number of 
occasions and has, with few exceptions,113  consistently reaffirmed that federal agencies manage 
federal land, but State fish and wildlife agencies manage the wildlife located thereon.114 
i. The scope of the authority of the Forest Service and Bureau of Land 
Management to manage wildlife in Utah 
 Despite overwhelming Congressional support for continued local management of wildlife 
by the States,115 Congress may act to explicitly preempt State management authority through the 
Property,116 Commerce,117 Treaty,118 and Necessary and Proper Clauses119 of the United States 
                                                
109  Codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (2014). 
110 106 Cong. Rec. 12078, 12079 (Senate June 8, 1960). 
111  Id.  
112  Id. at 12,085 (S. Humphrey) 
113 Such an example is the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, at least as interpreted by the 
10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Wyoming v. United States. 279 F.3d 1214, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that 
language of the Act allowed the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service to prohibit Wyoming officials from vaccinating elk on 
the National Elk Refuge). See also 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(m). 
114 See, e.g., Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528, the Wilderness Act of 1964, 
16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7), Federal Land Management Policy Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1172(b); Wild Free-Roaming 
Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1333(a); Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2909; Endangered 
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1535; Sikes Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 670a. For federal regulations espousing the same principle, 
see 43 C.F.R. § 24.3(b). See also Bureau of Land Mgmt., About the Greater Sage Grouse, (last visited Mar. 25, 
2015), http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/more/sagegrouse/conservation.print.html (“As the BLM and the USFS 
work on revising their land use plans, they are working in close coordination with state governments, which manage 
all resident wildlife . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
115 16 U.S.C. § 528; § 1133(d)(7); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).   
116 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 544 (1976); Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 99 (1928). 
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Constitution. State control and authority, therefore, is the default even on federal property unless 
Congress declares otherwise.120  
1. The Forest Service121 
 When the Forest Service was created pursuant to the Forest Service Organic Act in 1897, 
Congress could scarcely have imagined that one day their words would be used to justify 
limiting and restricting the authority of the several States to regulate hunting.122 Indeed, at the 
time the law was enacted, the leading U.S. Supreme Court opinion on the subject explicitly 
recognized State ownership and control of wildlife.123 Perhaps unsurprisingly then, the 1897 Act 
said nothing at all about State authority or jurisdiction—or even wildlife, for that matter124—nor 
did any member of Congress during debate on the bill.125  
                                                                                                                                                       
117 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1979). 
118 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). 
119 United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Fremont Cnty., Wyo., 145 F.2d 329, 330 (10th Cir. 1944) (holding 
that States have no authority to frustrate the disposition of federal lands as undertaken by Congress). 
120 As late as 2013, 48 states claimed state ownership of wildlife within their borders. See Michael C. 
Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1462-64 n. 204 (2013). To the 
extent State law conflicts with federal statutes regulating federal lands, such law is preempted. Kleppe v. New 
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 544 (1976).  
121 For a more comprehensive history of the administration of the National Forest System by USFS, see 
Hardt, supra note 51, at 351-69 (1994). 
122  The relevant section states, in part, that “[t]he Secretary . . . shall make provisions for the 
protection against destruction by fire and depredations upon the public forests . . . and he may make such rules and 
regulations and establish such service . . . to regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests thereon 
from destruction.” Sundry Appropriations Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat. 34, 35 (current version at 16 
U.S.C. § 551 (2012)). 
123 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1896) (“[T]he power or control lodged in the state, resulting 
from . . . common ownership, is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a trust for the benefit of the 
people. . . . [T]he state . . . represents its people, and the ownership is that of the people in their united 
sovereignty.”), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
124 Sundry Appropriations Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat. 34, 35 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 
551 (2012)). 
125 For an explanation as to the original meaning of the amendment granting the authority to prevent 
“destruction” of forest reservations, see 30 Cong. Rec. 912 (1897) (statement of Sen. Stephen White) (“I might add 
that it would be a good thing to incorporate in this bill a provision for taking care of [forest] reservations [i.e. 
National Forests]. I have seen from my own doorstep during last year, for three weeks, fires raging within the limits 
of a forest reservation within which there was no Government official to do any good and from which everyone who 
could have protected the flaming forest was by law excluded.”); Id. at 912-13 (statement of Sen. Richard Pettigrew) 
(“Under existing law these reservations are withdrawn from settlement, and yet no care is taken to preserve the 
timber therein. The consequence is that fires destroy more timber than all the settlers would consume.”). See also id. 
at 913 (recommending the amendment that became modern 16 U.S.C. § 551); id. at 969 (statement of Rep. Thomas 
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a. Much Ado About RNAs 
 Seventy years later, in 1966, the Forest Service promulgated a regulation authorizing the 
creation of “Research Natural Areas” or RNAs126 that relied upon the destruction-prevention 
provision of the original Organic Act.127 As a brief review of the history of this rule makes clear, 
the original regulation was based on a statute enacted in 1897128 that concerned only the 
authority to prevent forest fires and damage to the National Forest System.129 According to this 
regulation, the Chief of the Forest Service may establishes a RNA “to illustrate adequately or 
typify for research or educational purposes, the important forest and range types in each forest 
region, as well as other plant communities that have special or unique characteristics of scientific 
interest and importance.”130 Although the RNA program was codified in the Code of Federal 
Regulations in 1966,131 the Forest Service created the first RNA in the mid-1920s.132 This 
                                                                                                                                                       
McRae) (expressing need to prevent total destruction of forests). From these statements, it appears that the term 
“destruction” was used to refer to forest fires.  Impacts related to the presence of wildlife were not considered. 
126 This regulation, and USFS’s implementing procedures authorized the imposition of strict control 
measures on these particular Forest Service lands. Forest Serv. Manual ch. 4060, § .03 (“Research Natural Areas 
may be used only for Research and Development, study, observation, monitoring, and those educational activities 
that do not modify the conditions for which the Research Natural Area was established.”). On the other hand, the 
Forest Service Manual arguably binds only the Forest Service and has no power over the State. See infra Subsection 
I.C.iii (discussing the difference between legislative and interpretive rules). 
127  Experimental Areas and Research Natural Areas, 31 Fed. Reg. 5072, 5072 (Mar. 29, 1966) (to be 
codified at 36 C.F.R. § 251.23). 
128  Experimental Areas and Research Natural Areas, 31 Fed. Reg. 5072, 5072 (Mar. 29, 1966) (to be codified at 
36 C.F.R. § 251.23). 
129  The Congressional record from the time makes this point very clear. See 30 Cong. Rec. 912 (1897) (statement 
of Sen. Stephen White) (“I might add that it would be a good thing to incorporate in this bill a provision for taking care of [forest] 
reservations [i.e. National Forests]. I have seen from my own doorstep during last year, for three weeks, fires raging within the 
limits of a forest reservation within which there was no Government official to do any good and from which everyone who could 
have protected the flaming forest was by law excluded.”); Id. at 912-13 (statement of Sen. Richard Pettigrew) (“Under existing 
law these reservations are withdrawn from settlement, and yet no care is taken to preserve the timber therein. The consequence is 
that fires destroy more timber than all the settlers would consume.”). See also id. at 913 (recommending the amendment that 
became modern 16 U.S.C. § 551); id. at 969 (statement of Rep. Thomas McRae) (expressing need to prevent total destruction of 
forests). 
130 Compare 36 C.F.R. § 251.23 (2014), with Experimental Areas and Research Natural Areas, 31 Fed. 
Reg. 5072, 5072 (Mar. 29, 1966) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 251.23). 
131 Whatever the merits of the RNA program, there is no explicit Congressional authorization to create such 
a program, nor has Congress provided direct authority to protect the research aspect of the RNA. Instead, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 551 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to take action to prevent generalized destruction of National Forest 
lands. 16 U.S.C. § 551. 
132 U.S. Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t Agric., About RNAs: A Nationwide System (last visited Mar. 12, 2014), 
http://www.fs.fed.us/rmrs/research-natural-areas/about/. This was 39 years prior to the promulgation of the 
regulation from which the Forest Service claims to derive its power to so designate National Forest Land. 
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regulation, promulgated first in 1966, remains entirely unchanged today,133 although the Forest 
Service now justifies the restriction through a number of subsequent statutes as well.134 
 On its face, the RNA regulation declares that RNAs “will be retained in a virgin or 
unmodified condition.”135  When taken together with the Forest Service Manual, it becomes 
                                                                                                                                                       
Experimental Areas and Research Natural Areas, 31 Fed. Reg. 5072, 5072 (Mar. 29, 1966) (to be codified at 36 
C.F.R. § 251.23). 
133 See 36 C.F.R. § 251.23. 
134 This is important because a regulation may not convey greater authority to an agency than the statutory 
authority upon which the regulation rests. See, e.g. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans v. U.S. Postal Serv., 321 F.3d 1166, 
1173 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding Postal Service action ultra vires because Postal Service “exceeded its statutory 
authority”). Currently, the Forest Service considers the following statutes to provide authority for 36 C.F.R. § 
251.23:  7 U.S.C. § 1011; 16 U.S.C. §§ 472, 479b, 518, 551, 678a, 1134, 3210; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1740, 1761–1771. 
Special Uses, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,614, 16,621 (Apr. 3, 2006). In order, these statutes authorize the Secretary of 
Agriculture:  
• to “protect, improve, develop, and administer any property . . . as may be necessary to 
adapt it to its most beneficial use” (7 U.S.C. 1011(b)); 
• to “make dedications or grants, in his discretion, for any public purpose” (7 U.S.C. § 
1011(d)); 
• the Secretary of Agriculture to “make such rules and regulations as he deems necessary to 
prevent trespasses and otherwise regulate the use and occupancy of property acquired by, 
or transferred to, the Secretary” (7 U.S.C. § 1011(f)); 
• to regulate National Forests (16 U.S.C. § 472); 
• to issue permits “for skiing and other snow sports and recreational uses” (16 U.S.C. § 
497b); 
• to acquire lands encumbered by an easement or right-of-way held by the former owner of 
the land (16 U.S.C. § 518); 
• to make regulations to prevent the destruction of national forests by “fire and 
depredations” and “such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure 
the objects of such reservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and to 
preserve the forests thereon from destruction” (16 U.S.C. § 551); 
• to allow mining in Norbeck Wildlife Preserve, South Dakota and to make regulations in 
furtherance of that mandate (16 U.S.C. § 678a); 
• to give owners of private or State land surrounded by wilderness areas “adequate access” 
or exchange “federally owned land in the same State of approximately equal value” (16 
U.S.C. § 1134); 
• to provide access to owner of “nonfederally owned land” within the boundaries of the 
National Forest System (16 U.S.C. § 3210(a)); 
• to promulgate regulations “to carry out the purposes of [FLPMA]” within the National 
Forest System (43 U.S.C. § 1740); 
• to grant or issue rights-of-way across public lands for a variety of purposes (43 U.S.C. § 
1761-71). 
As regards wildlife management authority, each of these statutory authorizations is limited either by 16 
U.S.C. § 528 (land in the National Forest System) or § 1133(d)(7) (land designated as wilderness).  To the extent, 
therefore, that the Forest Service disallows State management of wildlife pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 251.23 the RNA 
regulation is ultra vires. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949). 
135 36 C.F.R. § 251.23. Although there are few cases testing the RNA rule and restrictions, those that do 
exist are all private actors suing the federal government over the creation of RNAs. See, e.g., Biodiversity 
Conservation Alliance v. Jiron, 762 F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2014); Park Lake Res. LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 378 
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apparent that the Forest Service claims the authority to manage RNA-designated land to 
discourage non-native species and encourage native species.136  
b. Permitting for use of National Forest land 
 Forest Service regulations designate most activities conducted on National Forest System 
land “special uses,” with a few exceptions.137 These regulations further require that a person 
obtain a permit before engaging in any “special use” on Forest Service land.138 As regards 
permitting for hunting and fishing, FLPMA prohibits such a requirement because it provides that 
the Secretary of Agriculture may not “require Federal permits to hunt and fish on public lands or 
on lands in the National Forest System.”139 
2. BLM140 
 The BLM, created pursuant to Congressional authorization in FLPMA during the mid-
1970s, “is the largest land manager, public or private, in the United States . . . . manag[ing] 
approximately 177 million acres of generally arid or semi-arid public land in the far western 
states.”141 In Utah alone, BLM manages more than a third of the State.142 The BLM’s very 
existence is a byproduct of the fact that, for the longest time, the lands now managed by BLM 
were considered worthless for almost anything at all.143 Interestingly enough, however, BLM 
                                                                                                                                                       
F.3d 1132 (2004).. The Author is unaware of any attempt by the Forest Service to apply the rule to State fish & 
wildlife management agencies. 
136 At least, it would do so if the regulation were applied to the States. Forest Serv. Manual ch. 4060, § .03; 
§ .02(3) (“The objectives of establishing [a] Research Natural Area [is] to: . . . [p]rotect against human-caused 
environmental disruptions.”). 
137 36 C.F.R. § 251.50 (“All uses of National Forest System lands, improvements, and resources, except 
those authorized by the regulations governing sharing use of roads (§ 212.9); grazing and livestock use (part 222); 
the sale and disposal of timber and special forest products, such as greens, mushrooms, and medicinal plants (part 
223); and minerals (part 228) are designated ‘special uses.’”). 
138 Id. 
139 16 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
140 For a more comprehensive history of the administration of the public lands managed by BLM, see 
Hardt, supra note 51, at 369-71 (1994). 
141 Joseph M. Feller, What is Wrong with the BLM’s Management of Livestock Grazing on the Public 
Lands?, 30 Idaho L. Rev. 555, 558 (1994). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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lands have turned out to be extraordinarily productive as BLM manages “more fish and wildlife 
habitat than any other agency” and lands that “constitute[] a major recreational resource for 
millions of Americans.”144 BLM also has responsibility under the Wilderness Act to designate 
lands that demonstrate “wilderness characteristics” as wilderness study areas or WSAs.145 
 As described above, the BLM’s authorities to act are found in FLPMA146 and the 
Wilderness Act, and those provisions reserve to the States the authority to manage wildlife.147 
The Wilderness Act in § 1133(c) prohibits certain activities in designated wilderness areas, such 
as commercial enterprise, permanent or temporary roads, motor vehicles, motorized equipment, 
motorboats, mechanical transport, aircraft landing, installations, and structures.148 These are the 
only activities prohibited under the Wilderness Act.149 There is no specific provision restricting 
state wildlife management authority, and § 1133(d)(7) specifically reserves to the States 
jurisdiction over wildlife management.150 Furthermore, section (c) provides that its restrictions 
are subject to exception “as specifically provided for” in section (d).151 Such an exception 
suggests, therefore, that the uses described in subsection (d) of § 1133—including the reservation 
of wildlife management authority to the States—are general exceptions to the restrictions 
imposed by § 1133(c) and that the activities described in section (d) may be carried out or 
achieved through means otherwise prohibited in section (c).152  
                                                
144 Id. at 558-59. In fact, the recreational value of these lands today exceeds the extractive value of the same 
land, dollar for dollar. Id. at 559. 
145 Id. at 559 n. 13. BLM no longer designates new WSAs, pursuant to the settlement agreement in the case 
of Utah v. Norton. Utah v. Norton, 2006 WL 2711798, *4-5 (D. Utah 2006), aff’d Utah v. U.S. Dep’t Interior, 535 
F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2008). 
146 The restrictions FLPMA places on BLM are the same as those on the Forest Service under the same Act. 
See discussion supra Subsection I.C.i.1.b. 
147 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7). 
148  § 1133(c). 
149  Id. 
150  § 1133(d)(7). 
151  § 1133(c). 
152  See, e.g., § 1133(d) (“The following special provisions are hereby made[.]”); § 1133(d)(1) 
(allowing the Secretary of Agriculture to use aircraft for “the control of fire, insects, and diseases” and directing the 
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 Despite the limited authority granted by these statutes, the language of the BLM Manual 
“prohibit[s], to extent practicable and permitted by Federal law, the introduction of any non-
native species into WSAs.”153 The Manual further concludes that “the BLM will remove, to the 
extent practicable and permitted by Federal law, any non-native fish or wildlife species from 
WSAs.”154 In addition, the Manual distinguishes between “prohibited” non-native species and 
“allowed” non-native species such as non-native fish “stocked before October 21, 1976”155 and 
feral horses and burros.156 Thus, it would appear that the phrase “to the extent … permitted by 
Federal law” would indicate that the BLM recognizes that there are situations where they do not hold 
requisite statutory authority to undertake the actions described in their policy manual.157 
ii. The procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act 
The requirements of NEPA are quite simple.158  NEPA requires completion of an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) before any major federal action that may affect the 
environment is undertaken.159 Although ordinarily a private or State actor need not complete an 
                                                                                                                                                       
Secretary to continue to allow aircraft and motorboats where “these uses have already become established”); § 
1133(d)(5) (“Commercial services may be performed within the wilderness areas designated by this chapter to the 
extent necessary for activities which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the 
areas.”). Some of these exceptions allow for particular activities—such as the use of aircraft or motorboats—that are 
otherwise prohibited, while § 1133(d)(7) is a very broad grant of authority. Compare § 1133(d)(1) (“Within 
wilderness areas designated by this chapter the use of aircraft or motorboats, where these uses have already become 
established, may be permitted to continue subject to such restrictions as the Secretary of Agriculture deems 
desirable.”), with § 1133(d)(7) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or 
responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish in the national forests. Nothing in this chapter 
shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and 
fish in the national forests.”) This suggests, at least, that § 1133(d)(7) was intended as an exception to the 
restrictions imposed in § 1133(c). 
153 Bureau of Land Mgmt. Manual, ch. 6330, § (D)(11)(e)(vii) 
154 Id.  
155 § (D)(11)(e)(ii). October 21, 1976 was the effective date of FLPMA. See 43 U.S. Code § 1701(a)(3). 
156 § (D)(11)(b) (“[N]othing in this section applies to Wild Horses and Burros . . . .”). 
157 Id. 
158 U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (last visited Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/. 
159 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).  
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EIS under NEPA,160 if a project is carried out by State or private actors utilizing federal monies 
or is carried out through State/federal or federal/private partnership, an EIS might be required.161 
NEPA is a procedural statute, not a results-based statute, so even in situations where an EIS is 
required, the agency need not select the option that causes the least amount of harm.162 
iii. Judicial deference (or non-deference) to administrative decision making163 
A federal agency’s interpretation of its Organic Act is subject to a special kind of judicial 
deference as established by the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. and its progeny.164 According to Chevron, the process of review is divided 
into two steps.165 At step one, the court must determine, through the use of canons of statutory 
construction and legislative history, “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.”166 If it has, the issue is resolved “for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”167 In that case, the court’s 
                                                
160 This is because such a project is not, by its very nature, a “federal action.” Carolina Action v. Simon, 
389 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (finding that where there is no federal involvement, there is no federal 
action), aff’d 522 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1975). 
161 Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.3d 1068, 1089 (10th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he distinguishing feature of ‘federal’ 
involvement is the ability to influence or control the outcome in material respects. The EIS process is supposed to 
inform the decision-maker. This presupposes he has judgment to exercise. The touchstone of major federal action, in 
the context of the case before us, is an agency's authority to influence significant nonfederal activity. This influence 
must be more than the power to give nonbinding advice to the nonfederal actor.... Rather, the federal agency must 
possess actual power to control the nonfederal activity.”). See also Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. 
Barnhart, 906 F.2d 1477, 1482 (10th Cir. 1990).  
162 Stryker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 519 (1978). The same holds true in the 
context of harms to wildlife: “[I]t would not . . . violate[] NEPA if the [federal agency], after complying with the 
Act’s procedural requirements, . . . decided that the benefits [of a particular option] justified [that choice], 
notwithstanding the loss of 15 percent, 50 percent, or even 100 percent of” that species in the affected area. 
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen’s Council, 490 U.S. 332, 551 (1989). 
163 For a more complete exposition of the same topic, see Devin Kenney, Potemkin Villages of the West: 
How a Simple Payment to Compensate Local Governments Became an Uncontrollable Federal Subsidy, __ 
WILLAMETTE ENVTL. L.J. __, __ (2015).   
164 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
165 Id. at 842-43.  
166 Id. at 842.  
167 Id.  
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construction of the statute is binding on the agency and limits the range of permissible 
interpretations of that statute.168 
However, even assuming Congress has not spoken to the precise question or that the 
statute is otherwise ambiguous, at step two the court does not have unbridled discretion to 
impose the meaning it prefers on the statute.169 In that case, rather, “the question . . . is whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”170 If the interpretation 
is permissible, the reviewing court must uphold the agency’s interpretation of the statute, 
whether that interpretation is the one the court itself would prefer—or not.171 This is because an 
agency is justified to make “a binding interpretation of a statute it administers” by virtue of the 
fact that Congress delegated to it the authority to make law.172  
However, not all agency rules or statements merit significant judicial deference.173 
Pursuant to § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an agency is required to engage in 
the process of informal notice-and-comment rulemaking when it announces a new rule unless 
                                                
168 Note, How Chevron Step One Limits Permissible Agency Interpretations: Brand X and the FCC’s 
Broadband Reclassification, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1016 (2011); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (“Once the court has spoken, it becomes unlawful for 
the agency to take a contradictory position; the statute now says what the court has prescribed.”). 
169 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (noting that “the court does not simply impose its own construction of the 
statute.”).  
170 Id. (emphasis added). 
171 See, e.g., Claire R. Kelly & Patrick C. Reed, Once More Into the Breach: Reconciling Chevron Analysis 
and De Novo Judicial Review After United States v. Haggar Apparel Company, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1170 
(2000) (“Under the second step, the court assesses whether the agency’s interpretation is permissible and reasonable. 
When the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, . . . step two requires the court to accept, or ‘defer to,’ a reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision by the agency that administers the statute.”). 
172 According to one author, “the justification for allowing an agency to make a binding interpretation of a 
statute it administers is that Congress delegated a portion of its law-making or legislative authority to the agency, 
and the agency’s resolution of silence or ambiguity through its interpretations represents an exercise of delegated 
legislative authority. Thus a threshold question under Chevron is whether the statute being interpreted is 
administered by an agency, as opposed to a statute creating a private right of action enforced by the courts.” Kelly, 
et al., supra note 93, at 1189-90.  
173 For example, “[a]n agency’s interpretation of a statute . . . is a question of law which is reviewed de 
novo.” Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 1998).  
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that rule qualifies for an established exception.174 Excluding emergency situations,175 an agency 
may only promulgate a rule without notice-and-comment procedure if it is either an interpretive 
rule or general statement of policy.176 Rules made pursuant to this exception—that is, decisions 
not reached through notice-and-comment proceedings or formal adjudication—are entitled to 
less deference or no deference at all by a court.177 On the other hand, the Court has noted that 
while such decisions and opinions do not command deference, they are, however, “‘entitled to 
respect’ . . . to the extent that those interpretations have the ‘power to persuade.’”178 
After Christensen v. Harris County, the Supreme Court made clear, in United States v. 
Mead Corp., that “[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has 
been understood to vary with circumstances.”179 In looking to those ‘varying circumstances,’ the 
Court looks to a number of factors including the formality and consistency of the agency’s 
decision.180 To whatever extent present, agency decisions also carry weight by virtue of the 
author’s logic and persuasiveness.181 Mead sets out a number of factors that lend a non-
legislative rule imposed or created by an agency  ‘power to persuade,’ such as the quality of the 
reasoning behind the decision and its consistency with the agency’s earlier and later actions.182  
                                                
174 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). These exceptions are “narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced.” N.J. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Protection v. U.S. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
175 § 553(b)(B). 
176 § 553(b)(A). One factor that a court considers “is whether a purported policy statement genuinely leaves 
the agency and its decision-makers free to exercise discretion.” Amer. Bus Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 
529 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
177 For example, when an agency “applies the policy [announced in a general statement of policy] in a 
particular situation, it must be prepared to support the policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued.” 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2006). 
178 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
179 Id. at 228 (majority); see also id. at 230 (limiting Chevron where agency decisions are not “the fruits of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication”). 
180 Id. at 228 (considering “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative 
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”). 
181 Id. at 235 (“Such a ruling may surely claim the merit of its writer’s thoroughness, logic and expertness, 
its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight.”).  
182 The full list of factors includes “[t]he thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
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II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE CURRENT DISPUTE: A CASE STUDY IN WILDLIFE 
MANAGEMENT 
On June 4, 2013 the Utah Wildlife Board approved the Statewide Management Plan for 
Mountain Goat, a 5 year planning document governing mountain goat management activities by 
the DWR.183 As part of the plan, the Wildlife Board approved the translocation of 20 mountain 
goats into the La Sal Mountains.184 The La Sals are largely comprised of federal lands owned 
and managed by the Forest Service as the Manti-La Sal National Forrest.185 Within this range is 
Mount Peale Research Natural Area, established in 1988 to protect “ecosystem structure and 
function in representative alpine and subalpine habitats.”186  
While many people applauded the Wildlife Board’s decision,187 some believe the 
introduction of mountain goats to the La Sals threatens endemic plant and animal species,188 such 
as the La Sal daisy and La Sal Pika, and ongoing research into climate change.189 These 
individuals question, therefore, the appropriateness of introducing non-native species such as 
                                                                                                                                                       
persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“Good administration of 
the Act and good judicial administration alike require that the standards of public enforcement and those for 
determining prior rights shall be at variance only where justified by good reason . . . . This Court has long given 
considerable and in some cases decisive weight to Treasury Decisions and to interpretative regulations of the 
Treasury and of other bodies . . . . We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator 
under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience 
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”). Presumably, the “factors 
which give [a decision or interpretation the] power to persuade” are those circumstances identified in Mead. Mead, 
533 U.S. at 228. 
183 UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., supra note 1, at 2. 
184  Id. at 18; Brown, supra note 2. 
185 U.S. Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t Agric., Welcome to the Manti-La Sal National Forest (last visited Mar. 12, 
2014), http://www.fs.usda.gov/mantilasal. 
186 U.S. Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Rare Plants and Alpine Vegetation of the La Sal Mountains: 
Studies of a Unique Ecosystem Rising Above the Arid Colorado Plateau Desert (last visited Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://www.fs.fed.us/wildflowers/Rare_Plants/conservation/success/LaSals_studies.shtml. 
187 Board meeting minutes available in audio format at 
http://wildlife.utah.gov/public_meetings/board_minutes/audio/13-06-04.mp3; public comment occurred between 
minutes 00:54:01 through 01:00:13; Byron Bateman with Sportsmen for Fish and Wildlife voiced his support for the 
plan. 
188 See generally Grand Canyon Trust letter, supra note 6. 
189 U.S. Forest Serv., supra note 185. 
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mountain goats to areas like the La Sals that have been preserved in a natural or semi-natural 
state.190  
The Forest Service initially supported the translocation project,191 but ultimately 
withdrew its support days prior to the 2013 Wildlife Board meeting.192 This change in support 
was, perhaps, a response to a NEPA request the Forest Service received from a concerned citizen 
group shortly before the decision on the introduction was to be made.193 Regardless, DWR 
moved forward with the translocation and released goats on State-owned property adjacent to 
federal lands.194 DWR’s current population objective is 200 goats.195  
DWR investigated translocating bighorn sheep to the La Sals,196 but conflicts with 
domestic sheep and the potential for disease transmission between domestic and wild sheep 
eliminated that possibility.197 Many areas in Utah are incompatible for bighorn sheep for similar 
reasons, and that niche can be filled by mountain goats because they utilize similar habitats and 
                                                
190 See generally Grand Canyon Trust letter, supra note 6. For discussion of this point, see infra Subsection 
III.C.i-ii. 
191 Letter from Angelita S. Bulletts, Supervisor, Dixie National Forest on behalf of Dixie, Fishlake and 
Manti-La Sal National Forests, to Kevin Bunnell, Regional Supervisor, Utah Division of Wildlife Res. (May 3, 
2013) (“[W]e support the Mountain Goat Statewide Plan and look forward to continuing to work with you.”) (on file 
with Author).. 
192 Letter from Nora Rasure, Regional Forester, Intermountain Region, U.S. Forest Service, to Gregory 
Sheehan, Executive Secretary, Utah Board of Wildlife (Aug. 21, 2013) (“The Forest Service does not support the 
proposal at this time . . . .”) (on file with the Author). the Forest Service later indicated that it had two concerns with 
the mountain goat introduction: first, that the introduction conflicted with the Forest Service’s RNA policy and 
second, that the introduction could “possib[ly] impact[] Forest Service regional plants.” Letter from Allen Rowley, 
Acting Supervisor, Manti-La Sal National Forest, to Kevin Albrecht, Chair, Regional Advisory Council, Wildlife 
Board (July 30, 2014) (on file with the Author). Mr. Rowley acknowledged, however, that the introduction was a 
“State decision and action.” Id. 
193 Grand Canyon Trust letter, supra note 6, at 1. Indeed, it is fair to say that the group demanded that the 
agency perform such analysis. Id. at 4-5 (“The fact that there is state involvement in the management of exotic 
bovids does not excuse the Forest Service from its obligations under the NEPA. . . . There should be no question that 
NEPA applies to this project.”). 
194 MOUNTAIN GOAT PHYSICAL IMPACTS IN THE LA SAL MOUNTAINS ALPINE AREA, INCLUDING THE 
MOUNT PEALE RESEARCH NATURAL AREA, WHITMAN COLLEGE 1 (Sept. 9, 2014) (on file with Author) [hereinafter 
MOUNTAIN GOAT STUDY].  
195 Id. 
196 Kristin Willis, Goats introduced despite protest, MOAB SUN NEWS (Oct. 2, 2013), available at 
http://www.moabsunnews.com/news/article_d1b4e5dc-2b97-11e3-af7c-001a4bcf6878.html. 
197 UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., supra note 1, at 7. 
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are not as vulnerable to disease from domestic sheep as bighorns.198 However, some believe 
mountain goats are not historically native to Utah, and question the appropriateness of 
introducing non-native species.199 A group of individuals taking this position wrote a letter to the 
Forest Service threatening legal action if the agency refuses to conduct a full NEPA analysis 
with regards to the goats and maintains that the agency not only has the authority to require the 
State of Utah to obtain a permit, but the duty to require it.200 
A second area of potential contention is the Deep Creek Mountains, a region on the 
western side of Utah.201 Much of this area is managed by the BLM as the Deep Creek WSA.202 
Again, domestic sheep grazing, and the attendant concern for the possibility of diease 
transmission to wild sheep, has prevented DWR from re-introducing wild sheep to the area.203 As 
described above, the BLM WSA Policy Manual explicitly prohibits the introduction of non-
native big game species into the WSA, setting the stage for potential conflict in the event state 
and federal management agencies in the event that DWR and the Utah Wildlife Board determine 
that this area is appropriate for translocation.204 
III. OF GOATS AND MEN 
                                                
198 Id. at 5-6.  
199 See generally Grand Canyon Trust letter, supra note 6. For discussion of this point, see infra Subsection 
III.C.i-ii. 
200 Id. Specifically, the Grand Canyon Trust maintains that Forest Service regulations impose a 
nondiscretionary duty on the Forest Service to require a permit for any use of Forest Service land. See 36 C.F.R. § 
251.50; § 293.10. 
201 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Deep Creek Mountains WSA, BLM.gov (last visited Mar. 20, 2015), 
http://www.blm.gov/ut/st/en/fo/salt_lake/blm_special_areas/wilderness_study_areas/deep_creek_mountains.html. 
202 Id. (“The Deep Creek Mountains WSA consists of 68,910 acres in Tooele and Juab Counties and is 
managed by the Utah BLM West Desert District. Flanked on the east by the Great Salt Lake Desert and on the west 
by the Deep Creek Valley, this 32-mile long, 3 to 15 mile wide range is located in west central Utah, adjacent to the 
Utah-Nevada state line and approximately 55 miles south of Wendover, Utah.  The Deep Creek Mountains are the 
highest landmark in all of western Utah.”). 
203 Deep Creek Mountain Goat Plan Minutes, Oct. 14, 2014, at 1 (on file with Author). 
204 See discussion infra Subsection III.B.iii. For example, under Utah Code 23-14-21, DWR has 
consultation obligations with the landowner and local county government prior to transplanting big game.   
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Although the topic of wildlife translocation may appear to be of but parochial interest, the 
issue is, at least in the Western United States, of great import to the management of wildlife for 
public recreation—both in terms of hunting and wildlife viewing.205 Current federal regulations 
impose illogical, biologically nonsensical distinctions between species of non-native wildlife that 
are allowed and those that are not206—distinctions that have no basis in underlying statutory 
law.207 Furthermore, the very term “native” is itself in question because, again, the federal land 
management agencies lack statutory authorization to regulate on this basis.208 Not only do the 
Organic and enabling acts of these agencies not define “native,” these Acts neither reference the 
term nor any concept commonly associated therewith.209 Significant evidence suggests that, if for 
example, mountain goats themselves (Oreamnos americanus) are not native to the region, then at 
least the genus (Oreamnos) likely is.210 
A. The translocation authority is an inherent part of fish and wildlife management 
authority that States, as trustees of protected wildlife, must utilize to effectively 
manage wildlife populations within their respective jurisdictions. This authority 
encompasses both the translocation of native and non-native, game and non-game 
species 
 The translocation power is ancient, dating back thousands of years.211 This power was 
exercised throughout antiquity212 and the modern era.213  In English history, for example, several 
                                                
205Given that “47% of the [land contained in the] 11 coterminous western states” is federally owned, any 
restrictions on State management authority in the West is a major limit on State authority to govern its own affairs. 
GORTE, supra note 30, Summary. Compare this number—47%--with the 4% of federally-owned lands in Eastern 
United States. Id. See also The Open West, Owned by the Federal Government, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/23/us/western-land-owned-by-the-federal-government.html?_r=0 
(noting that “[t]he top states with the greatest percentage of federally owned land are all the Western states” and 
listing the top ten states with the greatest percentage of federally owned land). 
206 Compare Bureau of Land Mgmt. Manual, ch. 6330, § (D)(11)(e)(vii), (f); with § (D)(10). 
207 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
208 See discussion supra Subsection III.C.i. 
209 Neither the Forest Service nor BLM have any statutory mandate to protect native species from non-
native or exotic species, except to the extent BLM enforces the Lacey Act as part of the Department of the Interior. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 42(a). 
210 See discussion supra Subsection III.C.ii. 
211  The rise of agriculture hastened the frequency of such introductions dramatically; after all, what is 
a crop plant or livestock, but a non-native, translocated species introduced for the benefit of man in a new 
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species now considered endemic (or native) to the British Isles were, in fact, introduced as game 
species by early conquering powers. Such species include the European Rabbit,214  Common 
Pheasant,215  and Fallow Deer.216 During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, translocations of 
game species were very common throughout the English speaking world217 by private,218 
federal,219 and State actors.220 In the case of game species, such as Common or Ring-Necked 
                                                                                                                                                       
environment? See Jared Diamond, Evolution, consequences and future of plant and animal domestication, Nature, 
Aug. 8, 2002, at 700-07 (“”Eventually, people transported some wild plants (such as wild cereals) from their natural 
habitats to more productive habitats and began intentional cultivation.”); 1 Nephi 16:11, Book of Mormon (“[W]e 
did take seed of every kind that we might carry into the wilderness.”); 1 Nephi 18:24, Book of Mormon (“And it 
came to pass that we did begin to till the earth, and we began to plant seeds; yea, we did put all our seeds into the 
earth, which we had brought from the land of Jerusalem. And it came to pass that they did grow exceedingly; 
wherefore, we were blessed in abundance.”). 
212  For example, the Romans or early Phoenicians are believed to have reintroduced Fallow Deer into 
Western Europe after the species, or a closely related species, died out after the last ice age. Safari Club 
International, Online Record Book: European Fallow Deer-North America Introduced (2015), 
http://www.scirecordbook.org/european-fallow-deer-north-america-introduced/. 
213 See generally HALVERSON, supra note 67. 
214  Rabbit were introduced following the Roman invasion of Britain in the early first century AD. 
Remains of Roman rabbit uncovered, BBC News (13 Apr., 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/norfolk/4439339.stm. See also Nigel Cross, Food in Romano-Britain, 
resourcesforhistory.com (2006), http://resourcesforhistory.com/Roman_Food_in_Britain.htm. 
215  As were pheasants. Id. 
216  Fallow deer were reintroduced by the Normans during the 11th Century following an earlier, 
apparently failed, attempt by the Romans to create a self-propagating population of the deer in Britain. British Deer 
Soc’y, Fallow Deer (Dama dama), http://www.bds.org.uk/fallow.html. Aristocratic hunters managed the deer 
population for centuries as a game species, while restricting hunting by the common people. Id. 
217  See, e.g. Dep’t of the Environment, Australian Government, Feral Animals in Australia (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive-species/feral-animals-australia 
(Australia: rabbits, sheep, red fox); Elizabeth Kolbert, The Big Kill, The New Yorker, Dec. 22, 2014, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/22/big-kill (New Zealand: mammals); History of grey squirrels in 
UK, The Telegraph, 18 Mar., 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/wildlife/10705527/History-of-grey-
squirrels-in-UK.html (United Kingdom: Grey Squirrels), United States (Rainbow Trout, Pheasant, Fallow Deer) 
218  American Acclimatization Society, supra note 72 (discussing wildlife released by the Society, 
including pheasants, starlings, sparrows, and salmon); Ornithological and Piscatorial Acclimatizing Society, Daily 
Alta California, Feb. 13, 1871, at 1, available at http://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a=d&d=DAC18710213.2.3#. See 
also HALVERSON, supra note 67, at 28-29 (discussing the role of private acclimatization societies in the translocation 
of game species throughout the world). 
219 Id. at 38.  
220 See, e.g., COLORADO PARKS & WILDLIFE, COLORADO PARKS & WILDLIFE: MOOSE REINTRODUCTION 1 
(Nov. 2013), available at 
https://cpw.state.co.us/Documents/WildlifeSpecies/Mammals/MooseReintroductionFactSheet.pdf (discussing the 
introduction of Moose in Colorado in 1978); Or. Dep’t Fish & Wildlife, Hunting in Oregon: Upland Bird Game 
Species (2014), http://www.dfw.state.or.us/resources/hunting/upland_bird/species/; Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 
History of Elk in Arkansas (2011), http://www.agfc.com/hunting/pages/huntingelkhistory.aspx (“In 1981, the 
Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, in cooperation with private citizens, initiated an[] elk restoration project in 
the Ozark Mountains of northwest Arkansas.”); State of Hawaii, Div. of Forestry & Wildlife, Game Mammal 
Hunting (2014), http://dlnr.hawaii.gov/recreation/hunting/mammal/.  
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Pheasant, Rainbow Trout, and various non-native cervids, they were introduced for much the 
same reason as in the instant case: increased recreational opportunities for sportsmen and 
women.221 
 Evidence suggests that mountain goat properly managed are a benign addition to 
ecosystems,222 but the issue here is not whether or not the introduction is or was a good idea.223 
That issue is one of science and policy, and was addressed via the series of public meetings and 
decision by a politically-accountable policy making board.  What is relevant is that humans have 
exercised the right to translocate species since before the beginning of recorded history,224 and 
that while Congress may act to curtail or limit this right,225 they have not done so.  This means 
that the authority remains with State fish and wildlife agencies to act within State law to 
introduce or translocate species.226 Therefore, the State of Utah continues to introduce avowedly 
non-native “exotic” fish like Rainbow Trout.227 These ongoing translocations, without opposition 
                                                                                                                                                       
Mountain Goats, in particular, have proved popular with many State wildlife management agencies and 
have been introduced in a number of areas. Wendell Harmon, Notes on Mountain Goats in the Black Hills, 25 J. 
Mammalogy 149, 149 (1949); John W. Laundre, Final Report: The status, distribution and management of mountain 
goats in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem (1990) (noting that “[s]ince the 1920's state wildlife agencies in the 
northwestern U.S. have introduced goats into previously uninhabited regions”); id. at 5 (“Personnel of the Montana 
Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks introduced 55 goats into various ranges northwest of Yellowstone Park 
between 1947-59 and 72 goats into the Absaroka/Beartooth mountains between 1942 and 1958. Twelve goats were 
introduced by the Idaho Department of Fish and Game into the Palisades /Black Canyon area near Swan Valley, 
Idaho in 1969-71.”) (citations omitted). 
221 HALVERSON, supra note 67, at 5.   
222  E-mail from Kerry Burns, Forest Wildlife Biologist, U.S. Forest Service, Black Hills National Forest, to 
Devin Kenney, Law Student, Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law (Mar. 3, 2015, 12:21 PM CST) (on file with Author). 
223 Admittedly, some of the translocations discussed above have impacted local environments negatively. Kolbert, 
supra 217. On the other hand, other species have become such a part of their new environment that they are almost considered 
indigenous. Remains of Roman rabbit uncovered, supra note 214. In either instance, the distinction is irrelevant here because 
Congress simply has not chosen to regulate wildlife translocations undertaken by the States as part of the State duty to manage 
fish and wildlife.   
224 Diamond, supra note 211, at 700-07.  
225 The Author does not question the broad authorization given to USFS, for example, to prevent the “destruction” of 
national forest land. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). This mandate is broad enough to justify the imposition of penalties against private 
persons and societies seeking to introduce or modify forest service land. 36 C.F.R. § 251.23 (2014). What is at issue, however, is 
that Congress directed the judiciary in the Forest Service Organic Act to construe the Act as not “affecting the jurisdiction or 
responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish on the national forests.” 16 U.S.C. § 528. Because Congress 
did not create the RNA program, see 36 C.F.R. § 251.23, it did not permit additional limitations being placed on State wildlife 
management authority pursuant to that designation, 16 U.S.C. § 528.   
226  UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-15-2 (2014). 
227  Including within Manti-La Sal National Forest itself. See Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, Great summer 
fishing at Cleveland Res, Wildlife News, June 13, 2014, http://wildlife.utah.gov/wildlife-news/1436-great-summer-fishing-at-
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by USFS, suggest State authority to maintain population of non-native species.228 Because, as 
will be discussed,229 BLM and the Forest Service lack the authority to limit this power as 
exercised by State fish and wildlife agencies,230 there is no reason to distinguish between the 
maintenance of previously established populations of introduced species and the establishment of 
new ones.231 
Moreover, the BLM and Forest Service are statutorily limited from “diminishing the 
responsibility and authority of the States for management of fish and resident wildlife” as that 
authority existed in 1976.232 Perhaps because there is no reasonable basis from which to dispute 
that States had the authority pre-1976 to maintain stocks of previously introduced species—such 
as Rainbow Trout—BLM draws a distinction between pre-1976 and post-1976 introduced 
species.233 Prior to 1976, however, the States did not merely have the authority to restock trout, 
but instead had the authority to manage fish and wildlife under State law.234 This authority 
included the introduction and translocation of species.235 The Forest Service and BLM cannot 
                                                                                                                                                       
cleveland-reservoir.html (“A treasure trove of excellent summer fishing waters are waiting for you on the Manti-La Sal National 
Forest in central Utah. . . . A total of 5,000 nine- to 10-inch rainbow trout are placed in Cleveland Reservoir in the spring and 
summer [by DWR].”). 
228  Id. 
229  See supra Subsection III.B. 
230  16 U.S.C. § 528; 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). The Forest Service conceded as much when it acknowledged, 
however, that the introduction of mountain goats was a “State decision and action.” Letter from Allen Rowley, 
Acting Supervisor, Manti-La Sal National Forest, to Kevin Albrecht, Chair, Regional Advisory Council, Wildlife 
Board (July 30, 2014) (on file with the Author).  
231  See discussion notes 233-37 and accompanying text. 
232 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
233 Bureau of Land Mgmt. Manual, ch. 6330, § (D)(11)(e)(ii). 
234 Congress emphatically declared that FLPMA “does not authorize exclusions simply because hunting 
and fishing would interfere with resource-management goals.” H. Conference Rep. No. 94-1724, at 60 (1976), 
reprinted in  U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175, 6229. Speaking of an earlier statute, the Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield Act of 
1960, one Senator read into the record a letter urging adoption of similar language on the grounds that preserved the 
intent of all parties not to interfere with State management authority. 106 Cong. Rec. 12078, 12,085 (S. Humphrey) 
(Senate June 8, 1960). The provision was adopted. Id. at 12079. 
235 See, e.g., UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., supra note 1, at 3 (noting that mountain goat were first introduced 
in Utah in 1967). 
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impose an extra-statutory distinction—one that BLM implicitly recognizes as invalid236—upon 
the States in derogation of existing State management authority.237 Thus, despite federal 
precedent to the contrary,238 the state ownership doctrine remains relevant because State law 
controls and this theory is dominant at the State level.239 
B. The Forest Service and BLM lack the authority to regulate or prevent the introduction 
of wildlife species, indigenous or not, into the lands they administer in the State of 
Utah 
 Given the void of Congressional authority for the Forest Service or BLM to regulate 
introduced non-native species managed by the States and the general reservation of wildlife 
management authority to the States, courts should err on the side of finding that authority 
remains with the State.240 Therefore, even if mountain goats are not native, the State of Utah has 
the authority to manage the species on all Forest Service and BLM lands within the geographical 
boundaries of the State of Utah.241 The Supreme Court has held that preemption must be specific 
in areas of traditional state authority.242 In this case, not only is there no explicit preemption, 
there is an explicit reservation of authority to the States.243  
                                                
236 Bureau of Land Mgmt. Manual, ch. 6330, § (D)(11)(e)(vii) (“The BLM will prohibit, to extent 
practicable and permitted by Federal law, the introduction of any non-native species into WSAs.”) (emphasis 
added). 
237 See discussion infra Subsection III.B. 
238 That is, federal precedent apparently contrary. In the absence of contrary statutory authority, the Kleppe 
and Hughes default favors State law. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 
U.S. 322, 336, 337 (1979). Only where Congress has utilized federal power to abrogate State authority or State law 
otherwise conflicts with controlling federal law, Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543, does federal precedent invalidate the State 
ownership doctrine, Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335-36. In Hughes, for example, the Supreme Court found an Oklahoma 
statute to discriminate against interstate commerce and thus to run afoul of the dormant commerce clause doctrine. 
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337-38. 
239 Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 120, at 1462-64 n. 204. 
240 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Lacoste v, Dep’t of Conservation of State of La., 263 
U.S. 545, 549 (1920); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-28 (1896). See also Fund for Animals, Inc. v. 
Thomas, 932 F. Supp. 368, 371 (D.D.C. 1996). 
241 UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-15-2 (2014). 
242 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976). 
243 16 U.S.C. § 528; 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
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 Some argue that the agency regulations at issue trump State law.244 After all, the 
regulations at issue are very specific: the introduction of non-native species is expressly or 
implicitly prohibited under both the Forest Service and BLM versions.245 Courts have held, for 
example that “[w]here the State’s law conflict with the . . . regulations of the National Park 
Service . . . the local laws must recede.”246 Though true—federal regulations promulgated under 
valid statutory authority and according to proper procedure may overcome State law—this 
argument does not apply here because Congress has not authorized either BLM or the Forest 
Service the authority to make regulations preempting State authority over fish and wildlife.247 In 
contrast, the example cited by the Grand Canyon Trust, a National Park Service regulation was at 
issue.248 In the National Park System, due to concerns over illegal poaching in Yellowstone and 
others,249 the default is a ban on hunting in parks unless the organic act of the specific park in 
question allows hunting.250 The Grand Canyon Trust is, therefore, seeking to compare inapposite 
concepts.  
While it is true that as apples and oranges are both fruit growing on trees,251 and both the 
lands managed within the National Park System and lands managed by BLM and Forest Service 
                                                
244  Letter from Audrey Huang, Supervising Attorney, Clinical Legal Education Program, Colo. Law, 
to Nora Rasure, Regional Forester, U.S. Forest Serv. 5 (Dec. 24, 2014). 
245 Bureau of Land Mgmt. Manual, ch. 6330, § (D)(11)(e)(vii), (f); Forest Serv. Manual ch. 4060, § .03. 
246  United States v. Brown, 431 F. Supp. 56, 59, 63 (D. Minn. 1976). 
247  Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Thomas, 932 F. Supp. 368, 371 (D.D.C. 1996) (“If Congress intends to 
exercise the undoubtedly plenary power of the federal government over hunting on federal lands in any respect, it 
has only to say so, ‘the game laws or other statute of [a] state to the contrary notwithstanding.’ In the absence of 
such explicit statutory direction, however, the Forest Service has concluded that its assertion of a general regulatory 
power over the practice of game-baiting in the national forests . . . would be, if not ultra vires, well within its 
discretion to eschew.”). 
248  Brown, 431 F. Supp. at 59, 63. 
249  16 U.S.C. § 1 (identifying purpose of National Parks as to “conserve the scenery and natural and 
historic objects and wild life therein.”). 
250  Nat. Rifle Ass’n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
251 See generally James E. Barone, Comparing apples and oranges: a randomized prospective study, 321 
British Med. J. 1569 (2000). 
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are all federally-managed land,252 the similarities end there. For example, in the Voyageurs 
National Park, hunting was banned with the creation of the National Park because it is a National 
Park subject to the National Park Organic Act;253 in the case of BLM and the Forest Service, 
Congress included savings clauses in the organic acts of each reserving the right of the States to 
manage fish and wildlife.254 Congress specifically reserved state wildlife management authority, 
and no BLM or Forest Service regulation can override that statutory reservation of authority.255 
i. To the extent the Forest Service’s Research Natural Area 
regulation is applied to and meant to apply to restrict the 
management authority of the State of Utah over wildlife in the 
National Forest, the application of the regulation is arbitrary and 
capricious or, alternatively, ultra vires. 
An agency’s interpretation of the statute that it administers may be entitled to significant 
deference256—but only to the extent that Congress did not statutorily foreclose that 
interpretation.257 Although the question of the case might seem to be whether or not the State of 
Utah has authority to translocate “non-native” wildlife, the real issue is much broader.258 As 
discussed above, there is no question that early Roman and English law allowed the translocation 
of game species of wildlife.259 This power was coupled with the continuing authority to regulate 
                                                
252 16 U.S.C. § 1; 16 U.S.C. § 528; 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
253  This is because Congress has spoken to, and resolved, the issue as required under the Kleppe 
framework. Nat. Rifle Ass’n, 628 F. Supp. at 903. 
254  16 U.S.C. § 528; 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
255  Nat. Family Planning & Reproductive Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F. 3d 826, 829 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006). 
256 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“We have long 
recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory 
scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations ‘has been 
consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved 
reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has 
depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations. If this choice 
represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the 
statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is 
not one that Congress would have sanctioned.’”) (citations omitted). 
257 Id. at 842. 
258 See generally Grand Canyon Trust letter, supra note 6; Huang, supra note 244. 
259 See, e.g., British Deer Soc’y, supra note 216; Cross, supra note 214. 
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the taking of the species once introduced.260 American wildlife law is but an outgrowth of the 
historical legal traditions of Roman and English law,261 and translocations by state wildlife 
management agencies continue to be commonplace.262 
In the Modern Era, both private263 and state264 actors continued—and continue—to 
exercise this common law authority,265 to the extent not modified by state statute or preempted 
by federal statutory law.266 In Utah, the state continues to hold translocation power.267 Therefore, 
it should be seen that the translocation power is but one aspect of wildlife management 
authority.268 As the Supreme Court concluded in 1976, although Congress may preempt this 
authority on federal land, the State exercises authority over wildlife unless Congress has 
explicitly declared otherwise.269 In this case, not only has Congress spoken to and 
unambiguously270 resolved the issue of whether it is the State or the Forest Service that manages 
wildlife, it has done so numerous times.271 Therefore, regulatory decisions, whether by regulation 
                                                
260 British Deer Soc’y, supra note 216 (discussing how Norman invaders introduced Fallow Deer and 
subsequently managed species for aristocratic use for centuries afterward). 
261 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522-28 (1896). 
262 See discussion supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
263 American Acclimatization Society, supra note 72 (discussing wildlife released by the Society, including 
pheasants, starlings, sparrows, and salmon); Ornithological and Piscatorial Acclimatizing Society, Daily Alta 
California, Feb. 13, 1871, at 1, available at http://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/cdnc?a=d&d=DAC18710213.2.3#. See also 
HALVERSON, supra note 67, at 28-29 (discussing the role of private acclimatization societies in the translocation of 
game species throughout the world). 
264 Here meaning governmental. Both Federal and State agencies acted to introduce game species and other 
species deemed helpful in the United States. See generally HALVERSON, supra note 67 (discussing role of Federal 
and State agencies leading to the nationwide introduction of Rainbow Trout). 
265 See, e.g., UTAH DIVISION WILDLIFE RES., supra note 1 (discussing State program stocking “exotic” trout 
in National Forest); COLORADO PARKS & WILDLIFE, supra note 220, at 1.  
266 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976). 
267 As evidenced by the continual reintroduction game species like Rainbow Trout. Great summer fishing at 
Cleveland Res, supra note 227. 
268 See discussion supra Subsection III.A. 
269 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539.  See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Lacoste v. Dep’t of 
Conservation of State of La., 263 U.S. 545, 549 (1920). 
270 There is no need to proceed to Chevron step two because the statute is not ambiguous. Congress plainly 
did not delegate to the Forest Service the authority that the Grand Canyon Trust believes that it has. Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 842-43. 
271 Most relevant here are the Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528, the 
Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7), and the Federal Land Management Policy Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 
1172(b). See discussion, supra Subsection I.B.iii. These statutes do not, on their face allow for any exceptions. To 
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or policy, that exceed statutory authorization are ultra vires and unenforceable.272 Neither the 
Forest Service nor BLM can (or may) amend statute through regulation, interpretive rule, or 
policy manual.273  
ii. As there is no documented destruction of federal property, the 
Forest Service’s authority under the Property Clause to prevent 
destruction is not yet available. 
Federal regulations and statutes acknowledge that each state has primary management 
authority over wildlife management on Forest Service and BLM lands within their 
jurisdiction.274 To the extent Congress acts to impose a legal regime, the federal government has 
absolute control over federal lands.275 Where the government does not act, however, this 
authority is reserved to the States.276  
On the other hand, the Forest Service has the well-established authority to limit State 
wildlife management activity—or at least to act in conflict with such activity—where State-
managed wildlife threaten the destruction of federal property.277 This authority dates back to 
                                                                                                                                                       
the extent BLM and the Forest Service are authorized to make exceptions to state authority, as allowed in FLPMA 
under certain exigent circumstances—such as to protect human safety—Congress has emphatically declared that the 
statutory authority of the Forest Service—and BLM—“does not authorize exclusions simply because hunting and 
fishing would interfere with resource-management goals.” H. Conference Rep. No. 94-1724, at 60 (1976), reprinted 
in  U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175, 6229.  
The provisions above are, however, far from the only instances where Congress has acted to reserve State 
authority to manage wildlife. See also Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1333(a); Fish and 
Wildlife Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2909; Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1535; Sikes Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 
670a. 
272 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. In the Forest Service example, in particular, because Congress did not 
create the RNA program, see 36 C.F.R. § 251.23, it cannot be rationally presumed that Congress acquiesced to 
additional limitations being placed on State wildlife management authority pursuant to that designation, 16 U.S.C. § 
528. 
273 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)-(B). For example, when an agency “applies the policy [announced in a general 
statement of policy] in a particular situation, it must be prepared to support the policy just as if the policy statement 
had never been issued.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also 
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). Nor, indeed, can it change its own legislative rule 
reaffirming the statute through the creation of contrary interpretive rules and policy manuals. 
274 For examples of statutes, see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 528; § 1133(d)(7); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). For examples of 
comparable regulations, see 36 C.F.R. § 293.10; 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(c). 
275 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976). 
276 Id. at 545; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). 
277 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 545-46. 
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Hunt v. United States where the Supreme Court upheld the Forest Service’s reduction of deer 
herds on federal lands in Arizona taken in response to the massive overpopulation of deer.278 
Although Congress has not acted to extend this authority to BLM,279 the Supreme Court’s 
reading of the Property Clause would certainly allow Congress to do so.280 In the interim, 
however, Hunt and its progeny merely stand for the proposition that to the extent a federal 
agency—such as the Forest Service or BLM—is charged with protecting federal lands or 
properties from “destruction,” the agency may act through its agents to “do whatever is 
necessary . . . upon its own property to protect it.”281 Actions taken pursuant to this authority—
the authority to prevent imminent, certain destruction—may be taken “without any regard to the 
game laws of the state.”282  
It is important to realize that at the time Hunt was decided, States were accorded broad 
control over and tacit ownership of wildlife, which had only recently been limited in a small 
degree.283 As a counterpoint to this authority, however, the Court’s decision in Hunt is entirely in 
accord with the then leading decisions on the authority of private landowners to protect their 
property from wildlife depredations.284 The few courts having addressed the issue in detail had 
                                                
278 Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 99-101 (1928). 
279 FLPMA, BLM’s Organic Act, has no comparable provision to that of 16 U.S.C. § 551 which directs 
“[t]he Secretary of Agriculture [to] make provisions for the protection against destruction by fire and depredations 
upon the public forests and national forests.” See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
280 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 537. 
281 United States v. Hunt, 19 F.2d 634, 640 (D. Ariz. 1927). 
282 Hunt, 19 F.2d at 641. 
283  Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (“No doubt it is true that as between a State and its 
inhabitants the State may regulate the killing and sale of such birds, but it does not follow that its authority is 
exclusive of paramount powers. To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are 
not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership.”). Confusingly, the Supreme Court in 
Lacoste, reaffirmed just four years later that States “owned” the wildlife within their borders. Lacoste v, Dep’t of 
Conservation of State of La., 263 U.S. 545, 549 (1920) (holding that State owns wildlife to the extent ownership is 
possible and is responsible, therefore, for the management thereof). The discrepancy here may arise from the fact 
that Holland concerned solely the regulation of migratory birds which, as noted by the Court, are very mobile: “The 
whole foundation of the State's rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, 
tomorrow may be in another State and in a week a thousand miles away.” Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. 
284  21 A.L.R. 199-200 (1922) 
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concluded that in situations where, as here, wild animals were caught destroying private property 
a person had a right to kill the offending wildlife in defense of that property.285 
Thus, the holding of Hunt is (1) that Congress can authorize the Department of 
Agriculture to preempt State law286 through regulation287 and (2) that as it does so by destroying 
wildlife, the United States government acts just as any private landowner could do.288 This does 
not mean that the federal government may control a species anytime it “feels” like doing so, 
much less to do so before putative damage has occurred.289 Just as a private landowner in 1928 
could not simply kill or destroy wild animals straying onto his or her property, but could do so if 
there is damage, the Forest Service is authorized to do likewise according to the Congressional 
grant of authority taken pursuant to the Property Clause.290 
                                                
285  See, e.g., State v. Burk, 195 P. 16, 18 (1921 Wash.) (“[I]t may be justly said that one who kills an 
elk in defense of himself or his property, if such killing was reasonably necessary for such purpose, is not guilty of 
violating the law.”); State v. Ward, 152 N.W. 501, 502 (Iowa 1915) (“It will be noted that the deer was killed, not 
only while upon the defendant's premises, but while he was actually engaged in the destruction of the defendant's 
property. Giving the testimony the fullest credence, the deer was one of great voracity. He was capable of doing, and 
was threatening to do, great injury to defendant's property. By way of analogy we may note that the plea of 
reasonable self-defense may always be interposed in justification of the killing of a human being. We see no fair 
reason for holding that the same plea may not be interposed in justification of the killing of a goat or a deer.”); 
Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N.H. 398, 404 (1873). 
More recent decisions have reached the same conclusion under similar circumstances. See, e.g., State v. 
Vander Houwen, 177 P.3d 93, 94 (Wash. 2008); Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371, 377 (Wyo. 1962); Cotton v. State, 17 
So. 2d 590, 591 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944). 
286 In Hunt, the law in question was Arizona’s prohibition on hunting deer outside of season. United States 
v. Hunt, 19 F.2d 634, 637 (D. Ariz. 1927). The Secretary of Agriculture’s authority preempted that law to the extent 
necessary to prevent destruction of federal property. Id. at 640-41 (“[W]e think there can be no doubt of the right 
of the government of the United States to do whatever is necessary for it to do upon its own property to protect 
it from the depredations complained of, including the killing or removal of whatever number of the deer as 
may be necessary, without any regard to the game laws of the state of Arizona.”). 
287 Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928) (“The direction given by the Secretary of Agriculture 
was within the authority conferred upon him by act of Congress.”); see also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 
539. 
288 Hunt, 278 U.S. at 100; UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., supra note 1, at 5 (acknowledging that “[i]f mountain 
goat use is demonstrated to be excessive, the Division must work cooperatively with the Forest Service to manage 
goat populations to acceptable numbers”). 
289 Note that the damage in Hunt was ongoing and pervasive. Id. Moreover, the Secretary had tried for 
some time to reach a compromise with the State before acting unilaterally. United States v. Hunt, 19 F.2d 634, 640 
(D. Ariz. 1927) 
290 21 A.L.R. 199-200 (1922); Hunt, 19 F.2d at 640. Today, the private right to destroy nuisance wildlife is 
governed by statutory law under principles that differ from those prevailing in 1928, when the Supreme Court 
decided Hunt. J.C. Vance, 93 A.L.R. 2d 1366 (1964). 
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Some have, and do, read Hunt to say much more than this, believing that federal land 
management agencies may engage in preemptive steps to prevent “destruction” by disallowing 
the introduction of non-native species or by removing them once introduced.291 Such a reading is 
in error, failing to fundamentally understand the distinction between a Hunt-like scenario and the 
use of the authority they purport to derive from the decision.292 Although the record at the 
Supreme Court is scanty, the lower court decision made extensive findings as to the destruction 
caused in the Grand Canyon National Game Preserve by the massive overpopulation of deer.293 
A brief sampling of this record is illustrative: 
[D]eer have increased in number so rapidly within the past three 
years that on certain parts of the lands there is no longer sufficient 
forage available for their subsistence. . . . [T]hey have committed 
great injury and damage to the said lands of the complainant by 
overbrowsing and killing the young tree growth, and the shrubs, 
bushes, and other forage plants upon which they principally 
subsist, all of which are of great value. . . . [S]ince November, 
1924, about 10,000 of them have died because of the fact that there 
was insufficient forage available for their sustenance, a large part 
of such loss by death having fallen on the fawns born during the 
summer of 1924, there now remaining only about 10 per cent. of 
such 1924 fawns.294  
Contrast this with the case at hand: preliminary survey research found that the primary—
exclusive—damage to the La Sal alpine environment came through damage to “sensitive soil 
crusts” and “trampled vegetation” that ostensibly the introduction of the mountain goat 
                                                
291 Huang, supra note 244, at 4. 
292 Although the private right is today limited by State law, formerly this right was considered to be very 
expansive. Annotation, Right to kill game in defense of property, 21 A.L.R. 199 (1922). Hunt, of course, recognized 
that State law could not limit the Secretary’s authority to prevent the destruction of federal property. Hunt, 19 F.2d 
at 640 (The United States, “[b]eing owner of the land, it, as a necessary consequence, owns every tree, without 
regard to age or size, and all growth of every character constituting part and parcel of the land. As such owner, the 
government is legally and justly entitled to protect the entire property of every kind and character, and by means and 
methods of its own selection exercised through its own agents.”). 
293 Id. at 636-640. 
294 Id. at 636. 
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caused.295 Besides the fact that neither this level of “damage” nor the number of animals—20 as 
compared to a herd of sufficient size to incur 10,000 mortalities in a single year from principally 
starvation—compares to that documented in the record in Hunt, the study is flawed because, in 
contrast to Utah’s long experience and expertise gained managing mountain goats,296 the study 
considers only one day in one year297 and the survey did not begin until after the goats were 
introduced, eliminating the possibility of comparing the condition of the area before and after the 
introduction of the goats.298  Furthermore, despite the participants’ efforts, the results make it 
impossible to say what damage, if any, actually resulted from introduction of goat, and what 
“damage” already occurred through use of the habitat by other large grazing animals such as 
deer, elk, and livestock.299  
The study even admits that (1) the hoof prints could not be identified conclusively as 
being mountain goat, only that they were assumed to be the hoof prints of mountain goats given 
the elevation,300 and (2) that elk, deer, and livestock cause the same damage to the same 
environment in the same way.301 And yet, no party seems to be calling for the removal of those 
                                                
295 MOUNTAIN GOAT STUDY, supra note 194, at 4-5; WILD UTAH PROJECT, SPECIAL STATUS PLANT 
OCCURRENCES AND MOUNTAIN GOAT IMPACTS: 2014 SURVEY REPORT 2 (Nov. 2014) (on file with Author). 
296 Wood, supra note 3. 
297 One day that occurred a mere two weeks after the goats had arrived in the area! MOUNTAIN GOAT 
STUDY, supra note 194, at 1. 
298 Id. at 1-2. This is problematic because this means there is no “baseline data on percent cover of alpine 
vegetation for future comparisons.” Laundre, supra note 220, at 15. 
299 MOUNTAIN GOAT STUDY, supra note 194, at 4. 
300 Id. at 5. 
301 Id. at 4. See also WILD UTAH PROJECT, supra note 295, at 1. Both studies—well, the one study and 
summary of that study featuring a map—raise the “straw man” hypothesis that the hoof prints might be those of deer 
or elk, but then dismiss the possibility because “any use by elk or deer . . . is cumulative.” MOUNTAIN GOAT STUDY, 
supra note 194, at 4; see also WILD UTAH PROJECT, supra note 295, at 2. The Author is not sure, what exactly, this 
is supposed to mean except that it acknowledges that deer and elk, which are indisputably native species, cause 
“damage” to “sensitive soil crusts” just fine without the help of any mountain goat. Research into the Grand Canyon 
Trust’s apparent animosity towards ungulate (hoofed) mammals is beyond the scope of this Article. Even so, “[t]his 
[apparent] lack of concern for demonstrated threats to wildlife and focus on hypothetical threats to a relatively small 
area of vegetation is puzzling.” Vernon C. Bleich, In My Opinion: Politics, Promises, and Illogical Legislation 
Confound Wildlife Conservation, 33 Wildlife Soc’y Bulletin 66, 67-68 (2005). 
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species!302 In short, the premature conclusions drawn from insufficient research, the 
inconclusiveness of that “research,” and the inability to tie the limited effects on the ground to 
the presence of mountain goats simply does not justify USFS action under the Hunt standard.303 
Even if the above were not true, there is no suggestion that mountain goats have harmed 
or will harm the RNA in any sense exceeding the “damage” inflicted through the introduction of 
prior species, like rainbow trout; the Grand Canyon Trust’s reliance on the Forest Service permit 
regulation borders, therefore, on the farcical.304 Grand Canyon Trust asserts that permitting is 
necessary based on the goats’ use of federal lands.305  If its interpretation is correct, then each 
goat needs to obtain its own permit in order to live and graze in the Mount Peale RNA.306 The 
flaw here is that the regulation was (and is) intended to apply to human use and occupancy, not 
the use or occupancy of land by wildlife.307 In sum, this reading contorts an otherwise 
straightforward regulation beyond all recognition.308 
iii. BLM’s WSA regulation and the Forest Service’s RNA regulation 
are ultra vires as applied to the State of Utah 
Both the BLM and Forest Service Manuals prohibiting the transplant of “non-native” 
species are non-binding because in neither instance does the language of the Manual control the 
                                                
302 See generally Grand Canyon Trust letter, supra note 6; Huang, supra note 244. 
303 Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928) (“The direction given by the Secretary of Agriculture 
was within the authority conferred upon him by act of Congress.”). 
304 Huang, supra note 244, at 9. 
305 See generally Grand Canyon Trust letter, supra note 6; Huang, supra note 244. 
306 After all, each goat uses the land the Forest Service manages separately. Id. 
307 Although this point seems rather obvious, animals are not people and are not subject to the same rights 
and legal duties as people. Alan Yuhas, Chimpanzees are not people, New York court decides, The Guardian, Dec. 4, 
2014, http://www.newslocker.com/en-us/profession/animals_news/chimpanzees-are-not-people-new-york-court-
decides/view/. Given that animals lack the right (and ability) to participate in the democratic process, it is fitting that 
they also lack the obligation to conform their behavior to the dictates emerging from that process. 
To stretch the ridiculousness further, consider the possibility of the introduction of a non-native species of 
wildflower. Would each plant need to apply for and receive its own separate permit or could the plant “community” 
apply for a permit as a whole? 
308 Furthermore, as noted in Subsection III.A, DWR currently manages wildlife resources in Manti-La Sal 
National Forest and it does so, in part, by annually stocking thousands of “exotic” Rainbow Trout into the waters of 
the National Forest. Great summer fishing at Cleveland Res, supra note 227. Grand Canyon Trust does not appear to 
argue that DWR has any need to obtain a “special-use” permit from the Forest Service to continue doing so. 
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State. Taking the Forest Service example first, to the extent the RNA rule prohibits the State’s 
management of mountain goat in the La Sal area, that regulation is ultra vires—none of the 
statutes cited give such authority to the Forest Service.309 The Forest Service may have authority 
to implement RNA restrictions against private parties,310 but not States because State authority to 
manage wildlife is reserved by the savings clause.311 To the extent the RNA rule and the Forest 
Service Manual attempt to change what Congress has established, the rule and manual are acting 
outside the authority of the Forest Service and are thus ultra vires.312  
As a brief review of the RNA rule history makes clear: the original regulation, which 
remains unchanged since promulgation, was based on 16 U.S.C. § 551.313 This statute, originally 
passed in 1897, concerned only authority to prevent forest fires and damage to the National 
Forest System.314 This statute remained unchanged in 1966 except for update to reflect 
codification of US Statutes.315 There is no reason to believe that the enacting Congress intended 
the Forest Service have or exercise this authority.316 
                                                
309  See discussion note 134 and accompanying text. 
310  Whether it does or does not is entirely irrelevant here and is beyond the scope of this Article. 
311  16 U.S.C. § 528 (2014). 
312  Where an administrative rule and a statute conflict, the statute always wins. See, e.g., Nat. Family 
Planning & Reproductive Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F. 3d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
313  Experimental Areas and Research Natural Areas, 31 Fed. Reg. 5072, 5072 (Mar. 29, 1966) (to be 
codified at 36 C.F.R. § 251.23). A brief review of the statutes claimed as authority for the regulation, shows that § 
551 remains Forest Service’s primary source of authority. See discussion supra Subsection I.C.i.1.a. 
314  The Congressional record from the time makes this point very clear. See 30 Cong. Rec. 912 (1897) 
(statement of Sen. Stephen White) (“I might add that it would be a good thing to incorporate in this bill a provision 
for taking care of [forest] reservations [i.e. National Forests]. I have seen from my own doorstep during last year, for 
three weeks, fires raging within the limits of a forest reservation within which there was no Government official to 
do any good and from which everyone who could have protected the flaming forest was by law excluded.”); Id. at 
912-13 (statement of Sen. Richard Pettigrew) (“Under existing law these reservations are withdrawn from 
settlement, and yet no care is taken to preserve the timber therein. The consequence is that fires destroy more timber 
than all the settlers would consume.”). See also id. at 913 (recommending the amendment that became modern 16 
U.S.C. § 551); id. at 969 (statement of Rep. Thomas McRae) (expressing need to prevent total destruction of 
forests). 
315  Compare Sundry Appropriations Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat. 34, 35, with 16 U.S.C. § 
551 (2012)). 
316  Indeed, given that the leading Supreme Court decision of the era specifically recognized the 
States’ near exclusive jurisdiction to regulate wildlife, any reference at all to the authority of State wildlife 
management would have been unnecessarily redundant. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1896). 
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Turning to the BLM, the policies it has adopted in regards to State fish and wildlife 
agencies’ management authority in wilderness areas are a direct contradiction of the limits 
placed on BLM by FLPMA and the Wilderness Act.317 The only uses of wilderness areas that 
are prohibited are: commercial enterprise, permanent or temporary roads, motor vehicles, 
motorized equipment, motorboats, mechanical transport, aircraft landing, installations, and 
structures.318 These are the only activities prohibited under the Wilderness Act, none of which 
relate to a preference for native over non-native wildlife.319 Neither does this provision restrict 
state management authority, because, again, § 1133(d)(7) specifically reserves to the States 
jurisdiction over wildlife management.320 The structure of the Act would seem to suggest that the 
uses described in subsection (d) of § 1133are exceptions to the restrictions imposed by the rest of 
the chapter.321 Therefore, a State may engage in the activities prohibited in § 1133(c) if necessary 
to “the jurisdiction or responsibilities” of that State “with respect to fish and wildlife.”322 Finally, 
this section of the Manual is itself ultra vires with regards to the very administrative regulations 
that it purports to interpret323 because, as the Department of the Interior recognized in 43 C.F.R. 
                                                
317  Compare Bureau of Land Mgmt. Manual, ch. 6330, § (D)(11)(e)(vii), (f) (“The BLM will prohibit, 
to extent practicable and permitted by Federal law, the introduction of any non-native species into WSAs. . . . the 
BLM will remove, to the extent practicable and permitted by Federal law, any non-native fish or wildlife species 
from WSAs.”); and Policies and Guidelines for Fish and Wildlife Management in National Forest and Bureau of 
Land Management Wilderness (2006) F.12 (“Transplants . . . of terrestrial wildlife species in wilderness may be 
permitted if necessary . . . . Transplant projects require advance written approval by the Federal administering 
agency.”); with 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (restricting BLM and the Forest Service to preempt State wildlife management 
authority only when necessary to prevent hunting or fishing “for reasons of public safety, administration, or 
compliance with provisions of applicable law”); and 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7) (reserving management of wildlife to 
the States). 
318  16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). 
319  Id. 
320  § 1133(d)(7). 
321  See § 1133(d) (“The following special provisions are hereby made[.]”); § 1133(d)(1) (allowing the 
Secretary of Agriculture to use aircraft for “the control of fire, insects, and diseases” and directing the Secretary to 
continue to allow aircraft and motorboats where “these uses have already become established”); § 1133(d)(5) 
(“Commercial services may be performed within the wilderness areas designated by this chapter to the extent 
necessary for activities which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas.”). 
322  § 1133(d)(7). 
323  Interpretive rules, by their very nature, must “interpret” something. Legislative rules "create law . . 
. incrementally imposing general, extra-statutory obligations . . . . [while i]nterpretative rules, merely clarify or 
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§ 24.4(c)—the regulation concerning BLM’s authority to manage wildlife in wilderness areas—
the States have “the primary authority and responsibility . . . for the management of fish and 
resident324  wildlife.”325 
iv. Agency manuals are interpretive rules that, although entitled to some 
deference, cannot be enforced judicially against the State 
 The Forest Service and BLM Manuals are either invalid as a legislative rule because they 
were created without notice-and-comment rulemaking as required by the APA326 or are merely 
advisory without substantive effect as they are interpretive rules.327 Although an agency may 
create a valid interpretive rule without utilizing the notice-and-comment process;328 such a rule, 
however, while perhaps binding to some degree on the discretion of the agency in achieving its 
regulatory goals,329 is binding on third-parties only to the extent that it does not conflict with the 
underlying statute330 and has “power to persuade.”331 Because neither the Forest Service nor 
                                                                                                                                                       
explain existing law or regulations." Alcarez v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984). Interpretive rules are not 
binding authority in the same manner as legislative rules. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  
324  Neither FLPMA nor 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(c) define “resident wildlife.” This leaves the definition to 
debate, as noted in Subsection III.C.i.  
325  To be fair, the BLM Manual does seem to acknowledge this—or at least hedge its bet—by noting 
that it will only act “to extent practicable and permitted by Federal law.” Bureau of Land Mgmt. Manual, ch. 6330, § 
(D)(11)(e)(vii), (f). A Manual is considered an interpretive rule under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). FLPMA, 
however, “does not authorize exclusions simply because hunting and fishing would interfere with resource-
management goals.” H. Conference Rep. No. 94-1724, at 60 (1976), reprinted in  U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175, 6229. 
326  Legislative rules must be created through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. This is true 
unless the rule falls within certain enumerated exceptions. § 553(b). These exceptions are “narrowly construed and 
only reluctantly countenanced.” N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection v. U.S. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
327  § 553(b)(A). One factor that a court considers in deciding whether a rule is interpretive or 
legislative “is whether a purported policy statement genuinely leaves the agency and its decision-makers free to 
exercise discretion.” Amer. Bus Ass’n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980). If the rule is a “mere 
statement of policy,” the agency “must be prepared to support the policy just as if the policy statement had never 
been issued.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 38. 
328  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)-(B). See also Alcarez, 746 F.2d at 613. 
329  Generally speaking, interpretive rules are binding to some degree on the discretion of the agency 
promulgating the rule.  Amer. Bus Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 529. 
330  Any rule or regulation that conflicts with statutory authority is invalid. Nat. Family Planning & 
Reproductive Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F. 3d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
331  The agency’s interpretation of the statute “contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law . . . are ‘entitled to respect’ . . . , but only to the extent 
they have the ‘power to persuade.’” Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944)). Considering that BLMs decision to restrict non-native species has no basis in either FLPMA or the 
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BLM utilizes the notice-and-comment process when promulgating its manual, the BLM policies 
are interpretive rules.332 They conflict with the underlying statue,333 and as interpreted by the 
BLM could lead to absurd results334 and, therefore, do not have the power to persuade.335 They 
must fall either as invalid or as inapplicable against the State.336 
v. The Forest Service cannot require the State to obtain a permit before 
using National Forest land to carry out fish and wildlife management 
activities. 
 Although Forest Service regulations ordinarily require the use of a special-use permit, 
this regulation cannot be applied as against the State.337 First, and most obvious, the permitting 
requirement is regulatory while the savings clause reserving to the State the right to manage fish 
and wildlife is statutory.338 Second, FLPMA makes explicit that the Forest Service cannot 
“require Federal permits to hunt and fish on public lands or on lands in the National Forest 
System.”339 If the Forest Service cannot require sportsmen obtain permits to fish or hunt, then by 
extension it cannot require State officials to submit to the permitting requirement in order to 
manage the fish and wildlife to be fished or hunted.340 Furthermore, the same provision makes 
clear that FLPMA is not intended to “diminish[] the responsibility and authority of the States for 
                                                                                                                                                       
Wilderness Act, and that it explicitly exempts feral horses and burros from this restriction, the Manual’s “power to 
persuade” is quite limited. Compare Bureau of Land Mgmt. Manual, ch. 6330, § (D)(11)(e)(vii), (f); with § (D)(10). 
332  Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; Alcarez v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984). 
333  43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
334 If BLM can make rules to prohibit the introduction of what they consider non-natives in order to protect 
their property, then what other limits could they place on wildlife management? Could BLM, for example, prohibit 
hunting immediately after rainfall because of potential “vegetation destruction”? See generally Bureau of Land 
Mgmt. Manual, ch. 6330.  
335  Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
336  Considering that the Forest Service has no authority, given the savings clause at 16 U.S.C. § 528, 
to restrict DWR’s wildlife management authority on any National Forest land in the State of Utah, the persuasive 
power of either the manual or the regulation is likely to be very low. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 38. 
337  See 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012); 36 C.F.R. § 293.10. 
338  The “special use” permit requirement is a creation of Forest Service regulation. 36 C.F.R. § 
251.50 (2014). The savings clause that preserves the State of Utah’s authority to manage wildlife is statutory. 16 
U.S.C. § 528 (2012). 
339  43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
340  Such a reading would seem to be contrary to the very spirit of FLPMA. Defenders of Wildlife v. 
Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“A state wildlife-management agency which must seek federal 
approval for each program it initiates can hardly be said to have ‘responsibility and authority’ for its own affairs.”). 
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management of fish and resident wildlife.”341 Prior to the enactment of FLPMA, States 
conducted translocations without any type of federal permitting requirement.342 To require a 
State to first obtain a federal permit before engaging in activity that clearly fall within the scope 
of the existing wildlife management authority, that authority would be “diminish[ed].”343 
Therefore, to the extent these mandates conflict,344 the statutory duty must control.345  
C. To the extent the agencies’ regulations are relevant or not contrary to Congressional 
mandate as applied to the States, the introduction of mountain goats violates neither 
the statutory nor regulatory duties the regulations impose. 
i. There is no statutorily—or even regulatorily—binding definition of 
native species, therefore, because mountain goats are native to 
Western North America, the goats should be regarded as a native 
species. 
 The relevant federal statutes do not utilize, much less define, the term “native species” in 
the context of land management authority.346 Assuming, arguendo, that Congress did authorize 
BLM or the Forest Service to restrict the introduction of non-native species, such authority alone 
                                                
341  § 1732(b). 
342  See generally HALVERSON, supra note 67 (describing the role of the States, private acclimatization 
societies, and federal government in the introduction and propagation of rainbow trout). 
343  § 1732(b). 
344 The Author would suggest that these requirements do not conflict, although clearly not all would agree. 
See Huang, supra note 244, at 9. 
345  There is no question that a statutory mandate overrules a regulatory one where there is a conflict, 
because “a valid statute always prevails over a conflicting regulation.” Nat. Family Planning & Reproductive Health 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F. 3d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2006). But see Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Elicker, 598 F. 
Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (D. Or. 2007), depublished by 2011 WL 3205773 (D. Or. 2011) (finding that the Forest Service 
special use regulation required Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife to obtain special use permit to introduce 
mountain goats in Scenic Area). 
346 Neither the Forest Service nor BLM have any statutory mandate to protect native species from non-
native or exotic species, except to the extent BLM enforces the Lacey Act as part of the Department of the Interior. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 42(a). Because there is no statutory definition or geographic limitation as to what constitutes a 
“native” versus “non-native” species, however, mountain goats meet at least the minimal requirements to be 
considered native under some definitions and usages of the term. See, e.g., “Native, adj.,” Oxford Dictionaries 
(2015), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/native (“animal of indigenous origin or 
growth.”); “Native, adj.,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2015), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/native 
(“[G]rown, produced, or originating in a particular place or in the vicinity.”). This is particularly true if, as will be 
discussed infra  Subsection III.C.ii, mountain goats are considered at the genus (Oreamnos), rather than species, 
level. If considered as either a genus or as a single species, the introduction of mountain goats in the La Sals could 
be described as “[t]ransplanting [within] the historical range of the species.” Bureau of Land Mgmt. Manual, ch. 
6330, § (D)(11)(e)(v). See discussion infra SubsectionIII.C.ii. 
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does not answer the question.347 Both agencies’ regulations employ a definition of “native” 
drawn from Executive Order 13112,348 hardly a reliable source of authority.349 More 
fundamentally, mountain goat are native to North America,350 and are rightfully considered 
“native to North America” and not a “non-native” or “introduced” species.351  
ii. Mountain goat (Oreamnos spp.) are native to Utah, but were extirpated 
by humans in prehistoric times 
 Again, assuming arguendo that BLM and Forest Services’ respective readings of their 
Organic Acts to favor native species is valid, fossil evidence proves that mountain goats of the 
Oreamnos genus were resident in Southeastern Utah less than 15,000 years ago.352 This species, 
Harrington’s mountain goat, became extinct 10,000 years ago during the great extinction of 
Pleistocene Megafauna in North America.353 Because the beginning of the mass extinction 
correlates with the arrival of humans in North America, overhunting and habitat change due to 
human interference are posited as the most probable causes of the extinction.354 Given the 
                                                
347 As noted, that would be assuming a lot. For example, Congress expressly directed the Forest Service 
that nothing in the Forest Service Organic Act “shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or responsibilities of 
the several States with respect to wildlife and fish on the national forests.” 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012). See also 43 
U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
348 Exec. Order No. 13112, 3 C.F.R. 13112 (2000). 
349 “The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the 
Constitution itself.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). Given that no Act of 
Congress grants the President the Authority to define “invasive” or non-native species, to the extent that any party 
relies on the Order itself for authority, it “cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s . . . power.” 
Id. 
350 Although this point is not in dispute, it bears repeating here. National Geographic, Mountain Goat: 
Oreamnos americanus (2015), http://animals.nationalgeographic.com/animals/mammals/mountain-goat/. 
351 Referring to Northwestern North America, it is clear that mountain goat are “a species that occurs 
naturally within a region, either evolving there or arriving and becoming established without human assistance” and 
are, therefore, native. “Native Species,” Science Dictionary (2009), 
http://www.webquest.hawaii.edu/kahihi/sciencedictionary/N/nativespecies.php. 
352 Jim I. Mead, et al., Extinction of Harrington’s mountain goat, 83 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 836, 
838-39 (1986). 
353 Id. (noting that the disappearance of Harrington’s mountain goat coincided with the disappearance of 
other North American mammalian megafauna such as Shasta ground sloths, Smilodon, and horse); id. at 839 (“All 
vanished at . . . a time when local plant communities were experiencing considerable turnover[], and also when 
Clovis big game hunters were active in the Southwest.”); id. at 836 (finding that synchronous extinctions of 
disparate large mammal species not consistent with climate-caused extinction). 
354 Id.; see also Jim I. Mead & Mark C. Lawler, Skull, Mandible, and Metapodials of the Extinct 
Harrington’s Mountain Goat, 14 J. VERTEBRATE PALEOBIOLOGY 562, 573 (1994) (“Analysis of the dung from the 
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explosion of modern human population in the mountain valleys of Utah, there is virtually no 
possibility that mountain goats could ever migrate from the ranges where they are located to 
colonize new areas of prime habitat.355 
At this time, the fossil record appears to indicate that the Harrington’s mountain goat was 
a separate species that became isolated from its common ancestor with Oreamnos americanus 
sometime near the end of the most recent ice age.356 Despite this evidence, it is entirely possible 
that the current consensus may shift as more remains are discovered of Harrington’s goat.357 As 
of now, the primary differences noted between the two species are a minor difference in overall 
size (i.e. Harrington’s mountain goat fossils are about 30% smaller than modern mountain 
goat).358 Such differences in size are hardly remarkable among disparate populations of the same 
species isolated from one another.359 
                                                                                                                                                       
Colorado Plateau implies that this small mountain goat ate a wide variety of browse and graze plants—whatever and 
‘anything’ that was available. Oreamnos harringtoni lived in a number of different plant communities . . . .[These] 
habitats would have varied between a ‘mesic’ riparian community . . . on north-facing slopes, to the arid slopes on 
eastern and south-facing slopes.”); id. at 573-74 (“The changing plant communities of the Colorado Plateau [during 
the Holocene], although severe, do not seem to have been drastic enough to rid the region of the entire menu of 
edible plants for this small mountain goat. Although the carrying capacity of the plant community(ies) needed for O. 
harringtoni is not known, it would seem fairly safe to say that it should be living someplace on the Colorado Plateau 
today.”). 
355 See generally UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., supra note 1. 
356 Paula F. Campos, et al., Molecular identification of the extinct mountain goat, Oreamnos harringtoni 
(Bovidae), BOREAS—AN INT’L J. OF QUARTERNARY RESEARCH 18, 22 (Jan. 2010). 
357 Often there is considerable debate among taxonomists—scientists that classify life into species—
between those seeking to discover new species and others that seek to consolidate the known lists of animal species. 
Size and minor morphological differences such as those that exist between know fossils of Harrington’s mountain 
goat and extant mountain goat are of the type that might “simply reflect[] the normal variation among individuals of 
the same species.” Understanding Evolution, Lumping or splitting in the fossil record, Evolution.Berkeley.org (Nov. 
2013), http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/news/131104_lumperssplitters (describing how certain physical 
differences between members of the same species might lead to the erroneous assumption that fossils found in 
different localities belonged to different species). 
358 Mead & Lawler, supra note 354, at 565 (distinguishing features of Oreamnos harringtoni from 
Oreamnos americanus are strong backward curve to horns, 1/3 smaller size, and prominent tendon attachment “on 
the anterior surface of metacarpal III”); id. at 570 (demonstrating similar appearance of two animals, including that 
Harrington’s mountain goat was white in color like existing mountain goat); id. at 572 (discussing further 
differences between the species, including proportional differences in the jaws); Mead, et al., supra note 352, at 836 
(“Compared to living mountain goats . . . Harrington’s mountain goat was small, with a more robust mandible, a 
distinctive palate, and larger dung pellets.”). 
359 GEORGE A. FELDHAMER, ET AL., MAMMALOGY: ADAPTATION, DIVERSITY, ECOLOGY 39-40 (4th ed., 
2005). 
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 Although direct evidence of Harrington’s mountain goat in the La Sal’s is not available—
at this time—the La Sal’s are within the expected range of the species and contain habitat similar 
to that in areas where Harrington’s mountain goat remains have been found:360 
 
Fig. 1: North American sites where remains of 
Harrington’s mountain goat (Oreamnos harringtoni) have 
been discovered361 
 
 
 
                                                
360 Mead & Lawler, supra note 354, at 563-65 (featuring map of “possible extent of Oreamnos harringtoni” 
which includes the La Sal area of Eastern Utah); id. at 572 (describing Harrington’s mountain goat as a “a mountain 
goat well-adapted to the steep canyon country of the Colorado Plateau”); id. at 573 (“O. harringtoni lived in suitable 
habitats in the Great Basin, throughout the Colorado Plateau, and presumedly southward along the mountainous 
corridor at the Arizona-New Mexico border. . . .”). 
361 Map of current locations wherein fossils of Oreamnos harringtoni fossils have been found, 
FAUNMAP/MIOMAP AT BERKELEYMAPPER, http://miomap.berkeley.edu/search.php (select “Database” box and 
choose “MIOMAP & FAUNMAP”; enter “Oreamnos” in “Genus” box; enter “harringtoni” in “Species” box; click 
search tab; follow “Map these localities” hyperlink). 
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Fig. 2: Map of Utah with Mount Peale (the site of Mount 
Peale RNA) marked.362 
 
There is, therefore, good reason to believe that the Harrington’s mountain goat once lived in the 
La Sal area363 and that the native plant life evolved in the presence of an ungulate very similar to 
modern mountain goat suggesting that the introduction of mountain goat will have a negligible 
impact on native species in the La Sal range.364 In fact, given that Harrington’s mountain goat 
were likely extirpated in part due to human influence, the introduction of mountain goats is more 
                                                
362 Map of Utah with Mt. Peale marked, GOOGLE MAPS, http:// https://www.google.com/maps (enter 
“Mount Peale, Utah” in “Search” box). 
363 Mead & Lawler, supra note 354, at 563-65 (featuring map of “possible extent of Oreamnos harringtoni” 
which includes the La Sal area of Eastern Utah); id. at 572 (describing Harrington’s mountain goat as a “mountain 
goat well-adapted to the steep canyon country of the Colorado Plateau”); id. at 573 (“O. harringtoni lived in suitable 
habitats in the Great Basin, throughout the Colorado Plateau, and presumedly southward along the mountainous 
corridor at the Arizona-New Mexico border. . . .”). 
364 Jim I. Mead, Mary Kay O'Rourke, & Theresa M. Foppe, Dung and Diet of the Extinct Harrington's 
Mountain Goat (Oreamnos harringtoni), 67 J. MAMMALOGY 284, 288-89 (1986)  (reporting the discovery of the 
pollen of numerous species of flowering plants in Harrington’s mountain goat dung such as Gramineae (grasses), cf. 
Leptodactylon (leptodactylon), Artemisia (sagebrush), Phlox (phlox), Juniperus, Eriogonum (wild buckwheat), and 
cf. Lesquerella (bladder pod)[,] . . . Leptodactylon, Phlox, Caryophyllaceae (pink family), Cercocarpus (mountain 
mahogany), Eriogonum, cf. Saxifraga (saxifrage), and cf. Lesquerella); id. at 291 (“Large pollen concentrations are 
contained in dung pellets when animals eat flowers. If forage did not include flowers or if it occurs when few plants 
are flowering, then far lower pollen concentrations would be expected.”). 
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an act of restoration than introduction, restoring the probable natural balance that once existed in 
the area.365 
iii. Mountain goats (Oreamnos americanus) are a reasonable proxy 
species for extinct Harrington’s mountain goat (Oreamnos 
harringtoni) and bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis). 
 As noted, Harrington’s mountain goats lived in and utilized the same habitats as modern 
mountain goat366 and shared a very similar diet.367  
 Bighorn sheep cannot be introduced into either Mount Peale or Deep Creek because of 
the possibility of transmission of disease between domestic sheep and wild flocks.368 Bighorn 
sheep are very susceptible to diseases borne by domestic sheep.369 In the interest of filling an 
                                                
365 Mead & Lawler, supra note 354, at 563-65 
366 Id. 
367 Much like modern mountain goat, Harrington’s mountain goat apparently ate whatever was available 
without strong preferences for one type of food over another. Id. at 573 (“Analysis of the dung from the Colorado 
Plateau implies that this small mountain goat ate a wide variety of browse and graze plants—whatever and 
‘anything’ that was available. Oreamnos harringtoni lived in a number of different plant communities . . . .[These] 
habitats would have varied between a ‘mesic’ riparian community . . . on north-facing slopes, to the arid slopes on 
eastern and south-facing slopes.”); id. at 573-74 (“The changing plant communities of the Colorado Plateau [during 
the Holocene], although severe, do not seem to have been drastic enough to rid the region of the entire menu of 
edible plants for this small mountain goat. Although the carrying capacity of the plant community(ies) needed for O. 
harringtoni is not known, it would seem fairly safe to say that it should be living someplace on the Colorado Plateau 
today.”). See also Mead, O’Rourke, & Foppe, supra note 364, at 290; id. at 291 (“[T]he extinct mountain goat 
consumed a diet which averaged 25% grasses and 75% herbs and shrubs.”) (citations omitted).. 
Compare, for example, the feeding habits of mountain goat in the South Dakota Badlands, where goats are 
unquestionably “exotic.” Harmon, supra note 220, at 149 (noting winter diet of introduced mountain goats in South 
Dakota Badlands as: “Moss and lichens, 60 percent; bearberry (Arctostaphylos uva-ursi), 20 percent; pinetwigs and 
needles (Pinus ponderosa) 10 percent; miscellaneous, including ferns, grasses, currant (Ribes sp.), juniper (Juniperus 
sp.), serviceberry (Amelanchier sp.), rose (Rosa sp.), willow (Salix sp.), and erigeron (Erigeron sp.), 10 percent”). 
368 UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., supra note 1, at 7. 
369 Id.; see also Wildlife Management Institute, Federal Agreement on Bighorns Draws Ire of Western 
States (2014), 
http://wildlifemanagementinstitute.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=318:bighorn-agreement 
(“Bighorn populations were locally extirpated in much of the West in the mid-20th century with anecdotal 
connections being made to the increase in domestic sheep grazing in adjacent areas. . . . . [E]fforts to reestablish 
stable populations have been hampered by periodic die-offs, and research began pointing to disease as a leading 
factor in the deaths. It’s estimated that the current bighorn population in the United States is less than 10 percent of 
what it was before settlement of the West. Because bighorn sheep and domestic sheep are so closely related, 
bighorns are thought to be highly susceptible to bacteria carried by domestic sheep, but to which domestic sheep 
tend to be resistant. Research has isolated specific strains of respiratory bacteria including mycoplasma and 
pasteurella . . . carried by domestic sheep that cause pneumonia and death in bighorn sheep.”). 
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open biological niche, therefore, introducing mountain goats, which are not susceptible to the 
same diseases as bighorn sheep, is a biologically sound approach.370 
iv. The introduction of mountain goats into the Mount Peale RNA does 
not constitute a “human-caused environmental disruption” because 
there is no evidence that the introduction of goats has disrupted or will 
disrupt any of the species the protection of which is the purpose of the 
RNA 
1. The presence of mountain goats likely does not threaten the 
continued existence of the La Sal Pika as evidenced by that fact 
that pika and mountain goat coexist without conflict in much of 
their home range 
La Sal Pika is a sub- rather than full species of American Pika.371 American Pika and 
mountain goats coexist without competition in the majority of the range of both animals.372 The 
two species coevolved—that is, they evolved in close proximity to one another.373 They consume 
similar foods but live very different lifestyles374—lifestyles that do not conflict with one 
another.375 Although mountain goats and Pika theoretically consume the same grasses and 
                                                
370 UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., supra note 1, at 4-5. Conflicts with other wildlife species should be 
something that is analyzed by the Wildlife Board—not the federal government.  The federal government’s role is 
limited to that of a land manager, not a wildlife manager. 122 Cong. Rec. 34,373 (1976) (“Traditionally, the States 
have regulated fishing and hunting of resident species of wildlife. The BLM and the Forest Service . . . have focused 
on management of their habitat. This bill does nothing to change that.”). 
371 If, indeed, it is even that: some authorities do not even recognize the La Sal Pika as even being a 
separate subspecies at all. See, e.g., David J. Hafner & Andrew T. Smith, Revision of the subspecies of the American 
pika, Ochotona princeps (Lagomorpha: Ochotonidae), 91 J. MAMMALOGY 401, 401 (2010). 
372 E-mail from Ruth Milner, Wildlife Biologist, Washington State Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, to Devin 
Kenney, Law Student, Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law (Mar. 6, 2015, 12:48 PM PST) (noting generally that 
American Pika and mountain goat do not compete with one another for food or habitat) (on file with Author) 
[hereinafter Milner E-mail]. 
373 Pika and goat “evolved together and although their occurrences may overlap, they occupy different 
niches; neither exhibit populations that appear to be above carrying capacity, so there is no reason to think one 
species may be out-competing and negatively impacting the other.” Id. 
374 Id. (noting that although Pika and goat both consumes “forbes [sic] and grasses,” each species inhabits 
very different areas within same overall alpine habitat); see also id. (“Goats also feed on shrubby materials like 
heathers and huckleberry which are much more abundant in meadows.”). 
375 Id. (Question: “Do pika and mountain goat coexist on the same mountains . . . ?” Answer: Yes, both are 
alpine species, pika specialize on rocky, scree type habitat, goats are found in those slopes, but are much broader in 
the types of habitats they use.  Walking in scree habitat is difficult, so goats may move through those habitats but it’s 
unlikely that they spend the majority of their time there because conditions are more favorable on other substrates.”). 
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forbs376 as food, pika live almost exclusively in talus slopes377 while mountain goats prefer 
mountain valleys and meadows where forage is more plentiful.378 Furthermore, while pika 
practice “haying”—gathering grass and forbs379 which they store overwinter to consume380—
mountain goats, on the other hand, practice altitudinal migration in search of more plentiful food 
during tough winter months.381 In sum, there is no evidence that the presence of goats in pika 
habitat presents a threat to the continued existence of the pika—or vice versa.382  
To the extent there is a native species with which mountain goats might conflict, that 
species is bighorn sheep.383 Even were there sheep in the La Sal area—which there are not 
following the extirpation of sheep due to overhunting and the introduction of disease—
significant enough differences exist between the diet, lifestyle, and habitat of the species to 
conclude that a small number of goats would do no harm to bighorn sheep populations.384 This 
                                                
376 According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture a forb is a “[v]ascular plant without significant woody 
tissue above or at the ground . . . . [which] may be annual, biennial, or perennial but always lack significant 
thickening by secondary woody growth and have perennating buds borne at or below the ground surface.”  U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SCI., GROWTH HABITS CODES AND DEFINITIONS, available at 
https://plants.usda.gov/growth_habits_def.html. 
377 Nancy J. Huntly, Andrew T. Smith, & Barbara L. Ivins, Foraging Behavior of the Pika (Ochotona 
princeps), with comparisons of Grazing versus Haying, 67 J. Mammalogy 139, 139 (1986). 
378 Milner E-mail, supra note 372. 
379 Huntly, Smith & Ivins, supra note 377, at 143. 
380 Id. at 140 (“Pikas are therefore of particular interest as foragers because they both graze plants directly 
and gather and store vegetation (hay) in caches (haypiles) among the rocks. . . .[H]aying contributes primarily to 
winter survival and successful initiation of reproduction in early spring.”). 
381 Clifford G. Rice, Seasonal Altitudinal Movements of Mountain Goats, 72 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 1706, 
1710 (2008). 
382 Milner E-mail, supra note 372. 
383 Laundre, supra note 220, at 2. See generally Thomas A. Lemke, Origin, expansion, and status of 
mountain goats in Yellowstone National Park, 32 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULLETIN 532 (2004). 
384 Id.  at 40-41 (“Data indicate food habits of sympatric sheep and goats diverge, especially in winter. 
Habitat use by both species also overlap but again, in sympatry, some separation seems evident. The differences in 
winter food and habitat use goats and sheep results mainly from differing wintering patterns. Sheep will often travel 
to traditional winter ranges well apart from summer ranges; goats more often concentrate their winter movements 
within or near their summer range. Indications are such movements are typical for sheep in Yellowstone Park. The 
result is a reduction in completion during the most critical time of the year. In the mountains north of Yellowstone, 
there is no evidence sheep populations have decreased as a result of increasing numbers of goats. Consequently, 
under the low population scenario, it is predicted goats will have little to no impact on sheep . . . .”); UTAH DIV. 
WILDLIFE RES., supra note 1, at 6-7.  
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point is moot, however, because there are no bighorn sheep in the La Sal region.385 The risk of 
conflict between translocated mountain goats and other wildlife populations was considered by 
the Wildlife Board and they determined that they were confident the conflicts would be 
negligible.386 
2. Even the study that the critics of the introduction program cited 
acknowledges that deer and elk cause the same damage that 
mountain goats might cause in the RNA 
Mountain goat impacts noted in the study were commensurate with deer or elk 
impacts.387 The Study relied upon by the Grand Canyon Trust was unable to differentiate 
between deer and elk grazing and hoof impacts and those cause by mountain goats.388 This is 
important, because elk and deer were not introduced to the area.389 Given that the RNA 
designation is meant to preserve the natural balance of the protected area, RNAs are not created, 
therefore, to preserve pristine habitat ungrazed by any animal.390 Nor are Forest Plans violated 
when mountain goats tread upon and consume RNA vegetation—even protected or sensitive 
                                                
385 Id. at 7. 
386 Deep Creek Mountain Goat Plan Minutes, Oct. 14, 2014, at 1 (on file with Author). 
387 MOUNTAIN GOAT STUDY, supra note 194, at 4. 
388 Id. 
389 UTAH DIV. OF WILDLIFE, SOUTHEASTERN UTAH’S MAMMALS 29-30, available at 
http://wildlife.utah.gov/pdf/mammal.pdf (describing as indigenous to the La Sal Mountains, wapiti [elk] and mule 
deer). 
390 Even if this were the goal, it goal would be impossible anyway, given existing grazing allotments within 
the National Forest. Thus, it is perhaps ironic that the Grand Canyon Trust is so concerned over the presence of a 
mere 200-300 mountain goats when domestic sheep, which are present in the area, are known to cause far more 
damage. See Bleich, supra note 301, at 67-68. See also MARY O’BRIEN, THE TROUBLE WITH A FOCUS ON KILLING 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN GOATS AND SELLING HUNTING TAGS, GRAND CANYON TRUST (2013), at 11 (map of existing 
grazing allotments in National Forest); id. at 13 (acknowledging that La Sal range is used for cattle and sheep 
grazing, among other uses); Barb Smith, Alpine Vegetation Impact Assessment, Canyonlands Natural History Ass’n, 
http://www.cnha.org/discoverypool.cfm?mode=detail&id=1219425572826  (noting that “feral and pack goats have 
been known to use area [sic]”). 
Sheep and domestic goat grazing are ongoing uses of the Manti-La Sal National Forest. Dixie, Fishlake, 
and Manti-La Sal National Forests; Utah; Initiation of Forest Plan Assessment Process, 79 Fed. Reg. 48721, 48721-
22 (Aug. 18, 2014). In the past, these areas were grazed more intensively by domestic sheep and goats than they are 
currently. Dean, So. Tent Mtn (UT), SummitPost.org (Aug. 23, 2009), http://www.summitpost.org/so-tent-mtn-
ut/178234. Furthermore, the Grand Canyon Trust’s apparent distaste for the use of the area by native deer and elk is 
a little odd. WILD UTAH PROJECT, supra note 295, at 1 (deploring the “damage” caused by elk and deer in the RNA). 
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vegetation.391 Additionally, the wallow areas identified in the Study were in areas devoid of 
vegetation.392 Indeed, the study fails to demonstrate or suggest how 20 mountain goats are 
disproportionately or disparately impacting the RNA in some way different than the much larger 
populations of deer and elk.393 The study also fails to consider sheep and cattle grazing in the 
same area394 and uncovered no evidence even demonstrating that goats damaged any of the four 
sensitive plant species at issue.395 Finally, even the map included with the study shows that goats 
barely used the RNA.396 
3. Mountain goat have been introduced elsewhere in Utah, and the 
country, without causing “environmental disruption” as long as 
they are managed properly 
History has shown that properly managed mountain goat populations, even if established 
by translocation, do not cause the habitat destruction that some opponents to La Sal population 
may fear.397 For example, a population in Cascades National Park, commonly considered to be 
the poster-child of poor mountain goat management, is very different because the goat 
                                                
391 In contrast to the position of Grand Canyon Trust, Huang, supra note 244, at 7-8, although the Forest 
Plan indicates USFS’s intent to protect native plant communities, the Plan does not require that the Forest Service 
take any particular action to ensure that these plants are protected, see Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Elicker, 598 F. 
Supp. 2d 1136, 1156-57 (D. Or. 2007) [hereinafter Friends I], depublished by 2011 WL 3205773 (D. Or. 2011) 
[hereinafter Friends II]. Therefore, it is not true that USFS’s failure to remove the goats is violative of the Forest 
Plan. Huang, supra note 244, at 6-8. 
392 MOUNTAIN GOAT STUDY, supra note 194, at 5. 
393 Instead, the Study relies on casting aspersions such as: recorded hoofprints “may be old,” suspected 
damage “might be cumulative,” and deer and elk  foraging  was not “knowingly recorded.” Id. at 4-5. The Grand 
Canyon Trust’s inability to demonstrate such damage is indicative of the fact that no apparent damage to the RNA 
has taken place as a result of the goat introduction. 
394 In fact, no mention at all is made of damage caused by grazing domestic goats or sheep. See generally 
MOUNTAIN GOAT STUDY, supra note 194. To be fair, the other document does note that “[t]his small mountain range 
has already incurred increased levels of browsing and grazing impacts from elk, deer, and cattle.” WILD UTAH 
PROJECT, supra note 295, 1. 
395 Both studies dwell, extensively, on the subject of these plants, but neither actually indicates that any 
damage has occurred to the plants. Id. at 3; WILD UTAH PROJECT, supra note 295, at 2. One might be tempted to 
think that the Grand Canyon Trust “doth protest too much.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act 3, Sc. 2 line 218 
(1602)  
396 WILD UTAH PROJECT, supra note 295, at 3. 
397 See, e.g., Laundre, supra note 220, at 40-41 (“Impacts on the ecosystem-Surveys of goat range in 
Glacier National Park, Montana and Mt. Baldy, Idaho with high densities of goats indicate little physical damage 
and percent cover of grass and forbs comparable to similar habitat in Yellowstone Park. Based on these surveys, 
goat densities in both Parks, even at high population estimates, would likely not be high enough to significantly 
impact the physical or floral components of the Parks.”) (citations omitted).  
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population is not managed by the State Fish & Wildlife agency.398 In fact, the National Park 
Service prohibits their hunting.399 Without hunting or a natural predator, goat populations 
boomed in the Park and they predictably caused damage.400 Again, this situation is unique and 
dissimilar to Utah since hunting is generally prohibited in National Parks, whereas it is permitted 
in BLM and Forest Service lands.401  Hunting of the La Sal population is a goal of Utah DWR in 
their Mountain Goat Management Plan, and would be considered by the Wildlife Board in the 
event that the population reached a level where it could sustain a harvest.402 
On the other hand, there is no other location where the introduction of mountain goats 
resulted in the deterioration of the existing floral communities and habitats. In Yellowstone 
National Park, for example, a study performed to determine whether mountain goats were 
causing damage403 found that mountain goats were responsible for no to very little damage in the 
Park and no action was either recommended or taken in response to the perceived “threat.”404 In 
South Dakota, where mountain goats escaped into the wild during the early years of the twentieth 
century in what is now a federal wilderness area and have since flourished,405 no damage is 
reported after almost 100 years of use by goats.406 Finally mountain goats are present in other 
                                                
398 Id. at 1 (“The impact of goats is compounded in Olympic Park because goats are protected from human 
hunting and therefore occur in higher densities than in exploited populations.”). 
399 Id. 
400 Id. 
401 Nat. Rifle Ass’n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
402 Deep Creek Mountain Goat Plan Minutes, Oct. 14, 2014, at 1 (on file with Author). 
403 Laundre, supra note 220, at 1. 
404 Id. at 25 (“Of all the faunal species in the Parks, increasing mountain goat populations would most likely 
affect bighorn sheep. Goats and sheep have similar niches along several resource axes and co-occur over much of 
their respective ranges. Mountain goats and bighorn sheep could compete for these resources through either 
interference or resource competition.”) (citation omitted); id. at 40-41 (finding that, despite expectations, at low 
population levels the presence of goats had no impact on bighorn sheep). See also id. at 48 (recommending the Park 
Service to take no action to reduce mountain goat numbers). 
405 Harmon, supra note 220, at 149. 
406 Burns E-mail, supra note 222 (“Mountain goats have been in that [sic] Black Elk Wilderness since the 
1920s (I think) -before it was designated wilderness. I am not aware of any research study done in the Black Elk 
Wilderness to determine effects of goats on vegetation. Goat numbers are small, and we haven't seen problems with 
vegetation. We do have some sensitive plant species and one ESA listed plant in the Wilderness and those are 
monitored for condition. I have not seen any effects or limitations tied to mtn goats.”). 
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Wilderness Areas in the State of Utah and managed by State in conjunction with federal input 
without negative habitat impacts.407 
IV. AND NOW FOR MORE OF THE SAME, WITH A SLIGHT TWIST: OR, WHY NEPA IS 
IRRELEVANT TO WILDLIFE TRANSLOCATIONS DONE WITHOUT FEDERAL CONSENT, 
APPROVAL, OR SUPPORT 
At the most obvious level, this much is clear: federal inaction is not action.408 For this 
reason, the Forest Service, quite reasonably, disclaimed authority over the introduction of 
mountain goats in the La Sals, noting that the introduction was a “State action” that it did not 
have the authority to prevent.409 “NEPA only refers to decisions which the agency anticipates 
will lead to actions . . . .[t]hat is, only when an agency reaches the point in deliberations when it 
is ready to propose a course of action need it produce an impact statement.”410 In the instance 
that the action considered is a private or State action, only “[w]here an agency initiates federal 
action by publishing a proposal and then holding hearings . . . , [does] the statute . . . appear to 
require an impact statement.”411  
Because the Forest Service has done nothing more than “not stop” the State of Utah from 
introducing goats on State-owned land, “there is nothing that could be the subject of the analysis 
envisioned by the statute for an impact statement.”412 In sum, there is no federal action “where an 
                                                
407 UTAH DIV. WILDLIFE RES., supra note 1, at 16. 
408 Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1239-40 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that the refusal of a 
federal agency to prevent State wildlife management agency from acting does not constitute reviewable action); 
State of Alaska v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 537, 537 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he nonexercise of power by an executive-branch 
officer does not call for compliance with NEPA . . . .”); Biderman v. Morton, 497 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 11974) 
(affirming district court dismissal alleging NEPA violation on the grounds that “in alleging only federal inaction, 
the complaint failed to state a claim under NEPA”). 
409 Letter from Allen Rowley, Acting Supervisor, Manti-La Sal National Forest, to Kevin Albrecht, Chair, 
Regional Advisory Council, Wildlife Board (July 30, 2014) (on file with the Author). 
410 Andrus, 627 F.2d at 1243. 
411 Id. at 1244. 
412 Id. at 1244. 
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agency has done nothing more than fail to prevent the other party’s action from occurring.”413 
Where at least one federal agency or another has not acted to regulate or otherwise facilitate 
private or state action, private or state action taken without the use of federal monies is not 
federal action.414 Therefore, although a host of minimal actions, such as “federal license[s], 
permits, leases, loans, grants, insurance, contracts, contract extensions and modifications, 
conveyances, assistance authorizations, approvals of right-of ways, or filings . . . may require 
preparation of an impact statement,” the agency need neither prepare an impact statement nor 
take further action under NEPA where the agency has done nothing, approved nothing.415 To 
require otherwise would be to impose an unreasonable administrative burden on the agency.416  
In a situation markedly similar to the controversy in Utah, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Oregon found that the Forest Service violated NEPA when it did not conduct an EIS 
before approving the introduction of mountain goats into a National Scenic Area,417 the 
Columbia River Gorge.418 The court concluded that the National Forest “special use” permit 
requirement applied to the State419 and, therefore, determined that the Forest Service’s decision 
not to require ODFW obtain a permit constituted a federal action.420 This case is distinguishable, 
                                                
413 Id. at 1244. 
414 See also Id. at 1245 (noting that in all instances where “major federal action[s]” have been found, the 
action taken was overt rather than “wholly passive”). 
415 Id. at 1245. 
416 Id. at 1246 (“No agency could meet its NEPA obligations if it had to prepare an environmental impact 
statement every time the agency had power to act but did not do so.”).  
417 The Columbia River National Scenic Area Act, which is not at issue in Utah, requires considerable 
federal intervention in the wildlife management role of the States: the statute created a commission with federal 
representation that had to approve wildlife management plans for the area.  There has to be a consistency review for 
some areas of the Scenic Area.  Thus there had to be federal action to approve the introduction. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 
544-544e. In the Manti-La Sal National Forest, no such commission exists and no such federal approval is required. 
418 Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Elicker, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1155 (D. Or. 2007) [hereinafter Friends I], 
depublished by 2011 WL 3205773 (D. Or. 2011) [hereinafter Friends II]. 
419 Id. at 1141 (explaining that Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife worked with the Forest Service to 
develop introduction plan for mountain goat in the Columbia River Gorge Scenic Area); id. (“On April 15, 2005, 
Forest Service finalized a Memorandum of Understanding with ODFW describing the cooperative efforts Forest 
Service and ODFW would take to establish a viable population of Rocky Mountain goats in the Scenic Area.”). 
420 Id. at 1153 (finding that special use requirement was binding on the State; USFS’s failure to require  
such approval was a “major federal action”). 
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however, because the Forest Service worked closely with the State of Oregon and approved the 
Reintroduction Plan created by the Department of Fish & Wildlife (ODFW).421 Moreover, 
although Friends I holds that the Forest Service’s failure to produce an EIS violated NEPA 
because it was required to approve or disapprove the Oregon Department of Fish & Wildlife’s 
Mountain Goat Reintroduction plan as a “special use” of the National Forest,422 there is 
considerable reason to question the value of this holding.423 
                                                
421 Id.at 1152 (“[T]he Memorandum reflects Forest Service assisted and cooperated in developing the 
Reintroduction Plan. In addition, the Reintroduction Plan itself defines the project as a cooperative effort between 
ODFW and Forest Service and indicates Forest Service will monitor vegetation and track the goats.”). 
422 Id. at 1153. 
423 First, the decision has been unpublished and was unpublished because of the limited precedential value 
of the ruling given the fact-specific circumstances that produced the decision. Friends II, 2011 WL 3205773, at *1-
2. Second, the decision is that of a district court in a different circuit (the Ninth) from that at issue in the Utah 
controversy (the Tenth), meaning that, at best, the decision is of minimal persuasive authority. Camreta v. Greene, 
131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n. 7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a 
different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.”).  
Third, the decisions of the Ninth Circuit are generally regarded with some skepticism outside the circuit, 
given the Supreme Court’s perceived hostility towards that circuit. See, e.g., Carol J. Williams, U.S. Supreme Court 
again rejects most decisions by the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2001, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/18/local/la-me-ninth-circuit-scorecard-20110718 (“It was another bruising year 
for the liberal judges of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals as the Supreme Court overturned the majority of their 
decisions, at times sharply criticizing their legal reasoning. . . . In their reversals, the justices often expressed 
impatience with what they see as stubborn refusal by the lower court to follow Supreme Court precedent.”); William 
Peacock, Ninth Battling to Regain Spot as ‘Most Reversed’ Circuit, FINDLAW BLOG, June 11, 2013, 6:03 AM, 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/ninth_circuit/2013/06/ninth-battling-to-regain-spot-as-most-reversed-circuit.html (“Lets 
play a word association game. What are the first things you think of when you hear "Ninth Circuit"?  Liberal. 
Western. Reversals. The Ninth's reputation precedes it . . . .”); Robert Barnes, Supreme Court reversals deliver a 
dressing-down to the liberal 9th Circuit, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/01/30/AR2011013003951.html (“In five straight cases, the court has rejected the work of 
the San Francisco-based court without a single affirmative vote from a justice. . . . ‘judicial disregard is inherent in 
the opinion[s] of the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.’”). Fourth, the district court failed to discuss USFS’s 
statutory obligation to allow the State Fish & Wildlife Department to manage wildlife in the National Forest. 
Friends I, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1152-54; 16 U.S.C. § 528. Fifth, the court relied exclusively upon the regulations 
themselves without analyzing USFS’s authority to make those regulations. Id. at 1152-54. As noted above, the 
application of this regulation to the State seems to conflict with USFS’s duty under the savings clause. Nat. Family 
Planning & Reproductive Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 F. 3d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
Sixth, the decision—even if good law in all other respects—seems to conflict with NEPA precedent like 
Andrus to the extent that it finds USFS’s failure to act under the special use regulation to be a “major federal action” 
requiring an EIS. See Friends of Columbia Gorge, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1153-54; Andrus, 627 F.2d at 1239-40 
(finding no major federal action where federal agency merely fails to prevent State from managing wildlife without 
consultation or approval of agency). See also id. at 1250 (§ 1732(b) of FLPMA “arguably permits (“may”), but 
certainly does not require (“shall”), the Secretary to supersede a state program, and even when he does so, it must be 
after consulting state authorities. We are simply unable to read this cautious and limited permission to intervene in 
an area of state responsibility and authority as imposing such supervisory duties on the Secretary that each state 
action he fails to prevent becomes a ‘Federal action.’ A state wildlife-management agency which must seek federal 
approval for each program it initiates can hardly be said to have ‘responsibility and authority’ for its own affairs.”). 
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Moreover, Andrus and Friends I are distinguishable from this case because both involved 
the actions of State wildlife managers on federal lands.424 Here, goats were introduced on State 
land adjacent to the National Forest.425 Contrary to the unfounded assertion of the Grand Canyon 
Trust, there is a very weighty “question” as to how the introduction of an animal by State 
wildlife officials on State land is a federal action.426 Ironically, the fact that the Forest Service 
pulled out its support of the project—after receiving Grand Canyon Trust’s communiqué—
removed the only possibility that federal action could be found.427 Remember, federal opposition 
to State action is not federal action.428 
Finally, it is not clear why the possibility of increased recreation should cause DWR’s 
decision to become a federal action429—after all, even in an RNA, recreational users are 
allowed.430 
                                                                                                                                                       
The burden imposed on the Forest Service by the Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960, codified at 16 § 
U.S.C. 528 is substantially similar to § 1732(b) of FLPMA and accordingly, would be analyzed in a similar fashion. 
Compare 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b), with 16 U.S.C. § 528.  
Finally, the court itself distinguished the case before it in Oregon, at least in part, from the situation at issue 
in Utah. Friends I, 598 F. Supp. 2d  at 1154. In Friends I, the Forest Service relied on an internal memorandum 
which opined that “where a state alone proposed introduction of a species and the proposed introduction was 
consistent with the governing forest plan. . . . NEPA documentation is unnecessary.” Id. Distinguishing the Oregon 
case from this hypothetical, the district court found that “a great deal of federal-state cooperation is mandated by the 
Scenic Area Act . . . . Moreover, the parties dispute whether the Reintroduction Plan as proposed is consistent with 
the Scenic Area Plan.” Id. That Act, the Scenic Area Act, is not at issue in Utah. This case is one of the sources of 
authority the Grand Canyon Trust relies upon in its letter. Grand Canyon Trust letter, supra note 6, at 5. 
424 Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Friends I, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 
1141. 
425 Brown, supra note 3. 
426 Grand Canyon Trust letter, supra note 6, at 5. 
427 Friends I, 598 F. Supp. 2d  at 1141. 
428 Andrus, 627 F.2d at 1239-41, 1250. 
429 Grand Canyon Trust letter, supra note 6, at 3 (“The stated purposes for this introduction are hunting and 
viewing, which are recreational activities that will involve additional impacts in this high elevation, roadless alpine 
area.”). The Grand Canyon Trust, despite its apparent delusions of grandeur, does not own, manage, control, or 
otherwise administer the Mount Peale RNA. Regardless of whether its members happen to want to exclude other 
users of the area, the uses contemplated—hunting and wildlife viewing—are not prohibited. Indeed, to the extent 
that the Forest Service is authorized to close an area to recreation “for reasons of public safety, administration, or 
compliance with provisions of applicable law” after consulting with the DWR. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
430 And anyway, recreational use is both ongoing and extensive. Smith, supra note 390 (“Recreation, 
mainly from trampling effects, has been well documented as an impact on alpine soils and vegetation . . . . With 
increasing recreation use, and also increasing requests for outfitter/guide and special event permits, a need to access 
the extent of impacts on the La Sal Mountains, especially in the Mt. Peale Research Natural Area (RNA) has been 
66 
 
V. (DO WITH THEM) AS YOU LIKE IT: ANALYZING THE AVAILABLE TOOLS, 
TECHNIQUES, AND METHODS OF WILDLIFE CONTROL 
The starting point of this discussion is again, that to the extent not preempted by federal 
authority, DWR may employ any means available in the exercise of its authority over wildlife 
management.431 There are instances where Congress has issued specific statutory directives 
regulate hunting on federal lands. For example, hunting in Alaskan National Parks and federal 
Refuges is regulated pursuant to a statutory mandate explicitly authorizing some amount of 
hunting, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.432 This law allows for significant 
state regulation of hunting on federal lands; however, the National Park Service is now 
considering taking a more active role in the direct regulation of these hunting practices.433 
Among the proposals put forth by the National Park Service is a codification of the current 
temporary ban on certain practices deemed by the National Park Service to disturb or alter the 
natural ecosystem.434 Specifically, the National Park Service has come out against hunting 
techniques and management practices designed to alter the natural balance between predator and 
prey for the purpose of increasing game for human hunters.435 This case is an example of explicit 
                                                                                                                                                       
identified.”); Rocky Mountain Research Station, U.S. Forest Serv., Mount Peale RNA 1, available at 
http://perceval.bio.nau.edu/mpcer_old/RMRS/RNAs/Utah/Mount%20Peale%20RNA.pdf (“The Middle Group rises 
very prominently southeast of the recreational "boomtown" of Moab. Hence, the RNA and adjacent lands are 
receiving increasing year-round hiking and skiing use.”). To the extent this is an issue, this is the problem of the 
Forest Service, not the State of Utah or DWR. Besides, it seems counter-intuitive, frankly, to suggest that 
recreational walkers ought to be banned—what exactly do the members of the Grand Canyon Trust consider 
themselves? See generally Grand Canyon Trust letter, supra note 6; Huang, supra note 244. 
431 16 U.S.C. § 528; Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976). Of course, DWR must do so in 
compliance with Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 23-14-1. Under Utah law, DWR is required to consult with the 
landowner, local government, and the public process (RAC and Wildlife Board) before taking action. Id. 
432 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-487,  94 Stat. 2371, December 2, 
1980 at 16 U.S.C. §§ 410hh-3233, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1784. 
433 National Park Serv., Alaska Reg. Off., Regulations (last visited Mar. 19, 2015), 
http://www.nps.gov/akso/management/regulations.cfm. 
434  Alaska; Hunting and Trapping in National Preserves, 79 Fed. Reg. 52,595, 52,595-96 (Sept. 4, 
2014). 
435  Id. 
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federal authority to regulate hunting—even here, however, the National Park Service took action 
only after extensive consultation with the State.436 
The Forest Service and BLM are acting under no such sweeping federal authorization as 
the National Park Service.437 Instead, their authority over the management of wildlife is 
constrained by both FLPMA and the Wilderness Act.438 As discussed, the Wilderness Act 
prohibits only commercial enterprise, permanent or temporary roads, motor vehicles, motorized 
equipment, motorboats, mechanical transport, aircraft landing, installations, and structures in 
wilderness areas.439 This provision does not restrict the exercise of state management authority, 
because, again, § 1133(d)(7) specifically reserves to the States jurisdiction over wildlife 
management.440 Furthermore, the structure of the Act would seem to suggest that the uses 
described in subsection (d) of § 1133are exceptions to the restrictions imposed by the rest of the 
chapter.441 Therefore, a State may engage in the activities prohibited in § 1133(c) if necessary to 
exercise “the jurisdiction or responsibilities” of that State “with respect to fish and wildlife.”442 
The only statutory exception to State wildlife management authority in FLPMA is the 
authorization of the Secretary of the Interior or Agriculture to close public lands or National 
Forest System lands to hunting or fishing “for reasons of public safety, administration, or 
                                                
436  Id. Even here, the Park Service could, if it so chose, decline to exercise this authority in favor of 
State management. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1239-40 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
437  16 U.S.C. § 1 (identifying purpose of National Parks to “conserve the scenery and natural and 
historic objects and wild life therein”); National Rifle Ass’n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1986). 
438  16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
439  16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). 
440  § 1133(d)(7). 
441  See § 1133(d) (“The following special provisions are hereby made[.]”); § 1133(d)(1) (allowing the 
Secretary of Agriculture to use aircraft for “the control of fire, insects, and diseases” and directing the Secretary to 
continue to allow aircraft and motorboats where “these uses have already become established”); § 1133(d)(5) 
(“Commercial services may be performed within the wilderness areas designated by this chapter to the extent 
necessary for activities which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas.”). 
442  § 1133(d)(7). The Department of Interior acknowledged as much when it stated that “the several 
States therefore possess primary authority and responsibility for fish and resident wildlife on Bureau of Land 
Management Lands.” 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(d). How could a State exercise “primary authority” if that authority were 
continually subject to potential restriction at the hands of BLM? Andrus, 627 F.2d at 1250. 
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compliance with provisions of applicable law.”443 What FLPMA does not allow the Department 
of the Interior or Agriculture to do is second-guess the wildlife management decisions of the 
States.444 A crucial part of those decisions concern, of course, the methods employed by the 
several States to achieve those goals.445 Barring the imminent destruction of federal land, which 
the Forest Service is authorized to prevent,446 there does not appear to be any federal restriction 
on the means or methods used to accomplish “the responsibility and authority of the States for 
management of fish and resident wildlife.”447 Any regulation, rule, or policy statement otherwise 
is without basis in statute and is, therefore, unenforceable against the State.448 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The State of Utah—or any other of the “several States” for that matter—has authority to 
introduce mountain goat and to manage species on BLM and Forest Service lands, including 
Forest Service RNAs and BLM WSAs, in line with the statutory and regulatory mission of 
DWR.449 Although Congress has broad power to regulate the use, protection, and management of 
public lands held by the United States, in the absence of Congressional mandates otherwise, the 
several States, in reality, hold primary wildlife management authority on federal land.450 The 
Organic Acts451 and land management statutes452 of the various federal land management 
                                                
443 16 U.S.C. § 1732(b). FLPMA, however, “does not authorize exclusions simply because hunting and 
fishing would interfere with resource-management goals.” H. Conference Rep. No. 94-1724, at 60 (1976), reprinted 
in  U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175, 6229. 
444 § 1732(b). 
445 Andrus, 627 F.2d at 1250 (“A state wildlife-management agency which must seek federal approval for 
each program it initiates can hardly be said to have ‘responsibility and authority’ for its own affairs.”). See also 
WESTERN ASS’N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES, supra note 84, at 2-4. 
446 See Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1928). 
447 § 1732(b). 
448 See discussion supra Subsection III.B.iii-v. 
449 Utah Code Ann. § 23-14-1. 
450 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976); Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1226-27 
(10th Cir. 2002). 
451 For the relevant portion of the Organic Acts creating the Forest Service and BLM, see 16 U.S.C. § 528 
(declaring that State Fish & Wildlife Agencies retain jurisdiction over wildlife in National Forests); 43 U.S.C. § 
1732(b) (same, regarding BLM-managed land). 
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agencies recognize and reserve State wildlife management authority in the majority of 
circumstances.453  
State authority to manage wildlife, therefore, remains not only relevant, but is the primary 
actor managing wildlife on all BLM- and Forest Service-managed lands, including wilderness 
areas, WSAs, and RNAs.454 The translocation power is as much a part of wildlife management as 
the regulation of hunting and fishing and has been exercised at least as far back into antiquity.455 
Because the Forest Service and BLM both lack explicit Congressional authorization to 
preempt456 State law as to the translocation of species on the public lands either agency 
manages,457 the State may exercise that authority to introduce any animal, native or non-
native,458 on any federal land where State has wildlife management authority.459  
 
 
Add: as it existed in 1976 
                                                                                                                                                       
452 Such as the Wilderness Act of 1964. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(7) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed 
as affecting the jurisdiction or responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish in the national 
forests.”).  
453 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 528 (“Nothing herein shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or 
responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish on the national forests.”); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) 
(“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as . . . diminishing the responsibility and authority of the States for 
management of fish and resident wildlife.”). 
454 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b); 36 C.F.R. § 293.10; 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(c). 
455 See discussion supra Subsection I.B.iii. 
456 See generally “The hierarchy of legislative enactments – State versus federal legislation – Preemption of 
state law,” 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 36:9 (7th ed.) 
457 See 16 U.S.C. § 528; § 1133(d)(7); 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b).  
458 This holds true unless that particular animal species is considered invasive and controlled under a 
legitimate Congressional grant of authority regulating invasive species. For a list of such federal laws and 
regulations in addition to a brief summary of the relevant powers Congress delegated pursuant to each, see Federal 
Laws and Regulations: Public Laws and Acts, National Invasive Species Information Center, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. 
(Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/laws/publiclaws.shtml. 
459 See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 545 (explaining that in the absence of contrary federal law regarding wildlife on 
federal land, “the States have broad trustee and police powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions.”). 
